Problematic Private Property: The Case of New York Taxicab Medallions by Wyman, Katrina Miriam
Problematic Private Property:
The Case of New York Taxicab Medallions
Katrina Miriam Wymant
Yellow taxicabs are an iconic symbol of New York City. Almost as well-
known as the City's yellow taxis are the valuable licenses that vehicles must
have in order to be used as taxis. Often called medallions, these licenses
constitute a form of private property. They are routinely bought and sold,
leased, used as collateral for loans, and count as assets in bankruptcy.
This Article emphasizes the political character of property rights in the
modern state through a case study of why New York taxi medallions continue to
exist.
Prominent explanations of the evolution of property rights imply that they
are a distinct category of rights that emerge organically within society because
their benefits exceed their costs. This Article takes a decidedly more regulatory
view of property rights as top-down creations of the state. As instruments of the
state, property rights arise and persist from political decision-making
processes influenced by interest group pressures. This avowedly regulatory
conception of property rights suggests that we likely have both efficient and
inefficient property rights because there is no necessary correspondence
between what is cost-beneficial for society as a whole and the outcomes of
political decision-making processes. This Article argues that New York taxicab
licenses are an instance of inefficient private property rights sustained by
political decision-making processes subject to pressures from powerful interest
groups.
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The Article makes two main contributions. First, it contributes to property
theory by emphasizing that property, especially in modern times, is an
instrument of state regulation that should be analyzed using the same tools
commonly used to study other regulatory instruments. In the contemporary
world property rights are not separate and apart from the state, and they are
prone to the same distorting influences as other forms of state regulation.
Second, and more concretely, the article draws attention to the manner in
which taxis are regulated in New York and elsewhere using problematic
property rights.
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1. Introduction
Yellow taxis are an iconic symbol of New York City.' Many New
Yorkers use them to get around because they do not own cars.2 Taxis also




transport tourists.3 Taxis routinely figure in movies and television shows about
New York. They also are the subject of frequent griping, trinkets that tourists
buy, and jokes on late-night talk shows.
Almost as well-known as New York's yellow taxicabs are the City's
valuable taxicab licenses, often called medallions. In New York and many
other cities in the U.S. and around the world, the number of taxicabs is limited
and a taxi driver must have a license to operate a vehicle as a taxi, in addition to
an individual taxicab driver's license.5 These numerically limited taxicab
licenses often are bought and sold much like conventional property rights in
tangible things such as houses. Indeed, since the fall of 2011, corporate New
6York taxi medallions have been selling for one million dollars or more each.
Since 1980, New York taxi medallions have been a better investment than U.S.
'7housing and gold. Elsewhere in the U.S. and abroad, taxi licenses also are
valuable.8
2. HENNINGSON, DURHAM & RICHARDSON ARCHITECTURE & ENG'G, P.C., TAXI MEDALLION
INCREASE: DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ES-3 (May 2012) [hereinafter HENNINGSON
DRAFT EIS] (prepared for the NYC Taxi & Limousine Comm'n), http://www.nyc.gov/
html/tlc/downloads/pdf/taxi medallion increase.pdf ("Fifty-four percent of New York City households
do not own a car."). In the borough of Manhattan, "only 24% of households own a car." Id.
3. Residents of Manhattan are by far the main consumers of yellow taxi trips in New York,
with 71 percent of taxi trips carrying Manhattanites. SCHALLER CONSULTING, THE NEW YORK CITY
TAXICAB FACT BOOK 6 (Mar. 2006) [hereinafter SCHALLER CONSULTING],
http://www.schallerconsult.com/taxi/taxitb.pdf "Outer-borough residents, suburbanites, U.S. residents
from outside the New York area, and foreign visitors each account for between 5% and 10% of all [taxi]
trips." Id.
4. This Article uses the terms license and medallion interchangeably.
5. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., POLICY ROUNDTABLES, TAXI SERVICES:
COMPETITION AND REGULATION 2007, 21, 200 (2008) [hereinafter OECD]; see also 35 R.C.N.Y. § 58-
12(a), (d) (West 2012) (requiring a medallion to operate a taxicab in New York).
6. Michael M. Grynbaum, 2 Taxi Medallions Sell for $1 Million Each, N.Y. TIMES CITY
ROOM (Oct. 20, 2011), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/20/2-taxi-medallions-sell-for-1-
million-each/; NYC TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM'N, 2011 Monthly Medallion "Accessible" Sales -
Average Prices & Number of Transfers (Dec. 2011), http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/pdf/avg
med price_2k I ldecember.pdf; NYC TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMMN, 2012 Monthly Medallion "Non-
Accessible" Sales - Average Prices & Number of Transfers, http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/
pdf/avg medprice 2012_september.pdf For a description of corporate taxi medallions, see infra notes
36-40 and accompanying text.
7. Ilan Kolet, New York City Cab Medallions Worth More Than Gold: Chart of the Day,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-31/ny-cab-medallions-worth-
more-than-gold-chart-of-the-day.html. According to the chart, medallion prices have increased over
1,000 percent since 1980, compared with 216 percent for housing and 181 percent for gold. See also
Dan Cumming, Why has the Price of Taxi Medallions Increased So Dramatically? An Analysis of the
Taxi Medallion Market, 17 THE PARK PLACE ECONOMIST 12, available at
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article 1313&context-parkplace (analyzing
increase); Felix Salmon, Why Taxi Medallions Cost $1 Million, REUTERS (Oct. 21, 2011),
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/10/21/w-hy-taxi-medallions-cost-1-million/ (analyzing why
medallions are valuable).
8. See, e.g., OECD, supra note 5, at 208-09 (indicating that licenses in Paris are valued at
C125,000, in Brisbane at A$405,000, and in Hong Kong at HK$3,000,000); MEDALLION FIN. CORP.
2010 ANN. REP. TO SHAREHOLDERS 7 (2010), available at www.annualreports.com/HostedData/
AnnualReports/PDFArchive/taxi2010.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2012).
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This Article analyzes the puzzling persistence of valuable taxicab licenses
in New York and in doing so emphasizes the political character of property
rights in the modern state. For decades, the general view among economists has
been that there is no public interest justification for limiting the number of
taxicab licenses.9 Since the late 1970s, valuable monopoly rights similar to
taxicab licenses have been eliminated in other transportation industries such as
airlines and trucking, as regulatory barriers to entering these industries have
been dismantled.10 Valuable taxicab licenses often are distributively unjust.
They make it difficult for individuals with limited skills to work in an industry
that has few natural barriers to entry, because drivers must either own or lease a
costly medallion to drive a taxi.'' By inflating fares and limiting the availability
of taxis, expensive licenses likely harm taxi consumers who in many places
include low-income earners who do not own cars.' 2 Why then do valuable
taxicab licenses persist in New York and elsewhere?
Starting from the position that New York taxicab licenses now effectively
constitute private property, this Article analyzes their endurance as an example
of private property persisting over time. An influential strand of scholarship
suggests that property rights are a distinct category of rights that emerge
organically within society. Theorists have argued that property rights exist
because they are efficient in that the overall benefits of property rights, such as
lower externalities and enforcement costs, outweigh their costs, including the
costs of establishing and monitoring them.
This Article adopts a decidedly more regulatory view of property rights as
top-down creations of the state. According to this view, property rights are just
one of a number of regulatory instruments used by the state to structure
incentives; taxes and legislative commands are others. As instruments of the
state, property rights arise and persist due to political decision-making
processes influenced by transaction costs, such as information and organization
9. See sources cited infra note 121 (discussing relevant economic literature).
10. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1323, 1323 (1998). Route certificates were the equivalent to taxicab
licenses when interstate airlines were highly regulated. Michael E. Levine, Note, Is Regulation
Necessary? California Air Transportation and National Regulatory Policy, 74 YALE L.J. 1416, 1422
(1965) (describing a route certificate as "potentially a valuable property"). Operating certificates were
the equivalent in regulated interstate trucking. DOROTHY ROBYN, BRAKING THE SPECIAL INTERESTS:
TRUCKING DEREGULATION AND THE POLITICS OF POLICY REFORM 22 (1987) (discussing estimates that
"placed the total value of operating certificates prior to deregulation at several billion dollars").
11. On the barriers to employment that limiting entry creates, see infra note 173. On the extent
to which medallions are leased and the significance of leasing fees as a share of driver expenses, see
infra note 33 and accompanying text.
12. OECD, supra note 5, at 8. On the impact of medallions on fares, see infra notes 178-79
and accompanying text. On the impact of medallions on service, see infra notes 174-177 and
accompanying text. On the demographics of taxi consumers generally and specifically in New York, see
infra note 183 and accompanying text.




costs.14 This avowedly regulatory conception of property rights suggests that
we likely have both efficient and inefficient property rights because there is no
necessary correspondence between what is cost-beneficial for society as a
whole and the outcomes of political decision-making processes. 5 This Article
argues that New York taxicab licenses are an instance of inefficient private
property rights sustained by political decision-making processes subject to
pressures from powerful interest groups.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides background on the New
York taxi industry and explains why New York medallions are private property
under the prevailing legal understanding of property. Part III analyzes and
emphasizes the limits of prominent explanations of the evolution of property
rights, and outlines the political economy theory of property rights as a
regulatory tool that animates the Article's analysis of the persistence of taxi
licenses. Part IV turns to the concrete question of why valuable taxi medallions
persist in New York. It argues that New York's current medallion system
cannot be rationalized in the cost-benefit terms that modern property theory
often uses to explain and justify property. Part V offers a political economy
explanation for the persistence of New York taxi medallions. Part VI offers
evidence for this explanation drawing on primary and secondary sources on the
history of taxi regulation in New York. The Article concludes by emphasizing
several of the implications of the story of New York taxi medallions for
property theory.
This Article makes two main contributions. First, it contributes to property
theory by emphasizing that property, especially in modern times, is an
instrument of state regulation that should be analyzed using the same tools
commonly used to study other regulatory instruments. Second, and more
concretely, the Article draws attention to the manner in which taxis are
regulated in New York and elsewhere using problematic property rights.1 7
14. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 30, 61 (2001).
15. For similar views, see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Evolution ofPrivate
and Open Access Property, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 77, 85 n.21 (2009); Brett M. Frischmann,
Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright Law, 3:3 REv. L. & ECON. 649 (2007); Saul Levmore,
Property's Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 181 (2003); and Saul Levmore, Two
Stories About the Evolution ofProperty Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S421 (2002).
16. See also OECD, supra note 5, at 7, 9, 17 (arguing generically based on international
experience that taxicab licenses are inefficient and sustained by pressure from interest groups); Jeff
Horwitz & Chris Cumming, Taken for a Ride: The Taxi Medallion System in New, York and Other Cities
Raises Fares, Impoverishes Drivers, and Hurts Passengers. So Why Can't We Get Rid of It?, SLATE
(June 6, 2012, 6:30 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2012/06/taxi medallions
how new vork s terrible taxi system makesfares higher and drivers_poorer html (arguing that
taxi medallion systems are difficult to eliminate partly because the benefits are concentrated in
medallion owners and lenders and the costs are widely dispersed across New York City).
17. Other legal academics have been attracted to taxi regulation in the U.S. as a topic. Classic
articles include Ross D. Eckert, The Los Angeles Taxi Monopoly: An Economic Inquiry, 43 S. CAL. L.
REv. 407 (1970); Edmund W. Kitch et al., The Regulation of Taxicabs in Chicago, 14 J. L. & ECON. 285
(1971); and Paul R. Verkuil, The Economic Regulation of Taxicabs, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 672 (1970).
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There are bound to be other examples of such rights given the state's pervasive
role in the formation and the maintenance of private property in modern times.
Indeed, some intellectual property scholars argue that copyright and patent
rights are inefficient.' 8 Also, many criticisms of modern land use regulation
imply that real property rights are inefficient in many circumstances. 19
11. New York Taxicab Licenses in Context
In a famous 1964 Article, Charles Reich argued that many forms of
government largess, such as licenses, franchises, benefits and contracts, should
be recognized as "new property." 20 Among the types of largess he identified as
warranting this label were New York taxi medallions,21 which he noted were
worth "$21,000 to $23,000" in 1961.22 Almost five decades later, New York
medallion prices have increased roughly six-fold in real terms.23
To set the stage for analyzing the persistence of New York taxicab
licenses, this Part provides an overview of the New York taxi industry and the
way it is regulated, and explains why New York taxi medallions are a form of
private property.
A. Overview of the New York Taxi Industry and Its Regulation
In New York, taxis generally are regulated by the City Council, and on a
day-to-day basis by the Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC). Created in
1971, the TLC has nine commissioners "appointed by the Mayor with the
advice and consent of the council."24 The City Council has particular influence
over the appointment of five commissioners, each of whom must reside in one
of the City's five boroughs and have the support of the majority of the council
members from the borough before appointment by the mayor.25 The remaining
18. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATION AT RISK (2008); Frischmann, supra note 15.
19. See, e.g., KOMESAR, supra note 14, at 57.
20. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733 (1964).
21. Id. at 735.
22. Id. at 735 n.7 (citing Joseph C. Ingraham, Taxi Medallions Going Up in Price, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 1961, at 46). In 2012 dollars, that is equivalent to $159,196.15 to $174,357.69. Real
values were calculated using the CP1 Inflation Calculator. CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB.,
BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation calculator.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2012).
23. For clarity, the prices being compared are the prices of corporate medallions. See
Ingraham, supra note 22; Grynbaum, supra note 6. On the different types of medallions, see infra notes
36-40 and accompanying text.
24. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 2301(a). The TLC had a staff of more than 400 and a budget of $32
million in 2012. About TLC, NYC TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM'N, www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/about/
about.shtml (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (number of employees); Hearing on Executive Budget for Fiscal
Year 2012 Before the City Council Transportation and Finance Committees (June 2, 2011) (testimony
of David Yassky, NYC Taxi & Limousine Comm'r/Chair), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/
downloads/pdf/testimony_06_02_1 1.pdf (2012).




four commissioners are nominated by the mayor, who also chooses the TLC
chair from among commission members.26 As discussed below, the council's
role in appointing TLC commissioners historically has provided a means for
the taxi industry to influence the TLC to protect taxi medallions.27
Together, the TLC and the council have created a regulatory regime that
segments New York taxis into two sectors: (1) yellow medallion taxis and (2)
for-hire vehicles (FHV).
1. Yellow Medallion Taxis
Yellow medallion taxis are the taxis that roam city streets, must be painted
yellow, and have one of the limited number of medallions that are the focus of
this Article.28 The number of medallions currently is restricted by law to
13,237.29 Requiring that cabs bear a medallion to operate limits the overall
number of taxis in the City.30 Literally the piece of silver metal affixed to the
right hood of a yellow taxi, a medallion is the visible symbol that a taxi is
licensed to be on city streets. Medallions may be owned or leased.32 Perhaps
26. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 2301(c). The chair runs the TLC on a day-to-day basis and is the only
paid commissioner. Id.
27. The number of commissioners and the mechanisms by which they are appointed were
negotiated by Mayor John Lindsay and the City Council when the TLC was created. Lindsay, who
championed the creation of the TLC, gave up discretion in the appointment of commissioners to get
enough council support for the establishment of the TLC. Maurice Carroll, Proposal for City Taxi
Commission Gains in Council, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1971, at 16.
28. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 19-514(a), (f) (2011); 35 R.C.N.Y. § 67-07 (West 2012); 35
R.C.N.Y. § 58-12(a) (West 2012).
29. NYC TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM'N, ANN. REP. 2009, at 9.
30. MARK W. FRANKENA & PAUL A. PAULTER, FED. TRADE COMM'N, AN ECON. ANALYSIS
OF TAXICAB REG. 16 (Bureau of Economics Staff Report, May 1984); Jon-Terje Bekken, Experiences
With (De-)Regulation in the European Taxi Industry, in (DE)REGULATION OF THE TAXI INDUSTRY
ROUND TABLE No. 133, at 31, 40-41 (European Conference of Ministers of Transport ed., 2007)
[hereinafter (DE)REGULATION ROUND TABLE]; Kenneth M. Gwilliam, Regulation of Taxi Markets in
Developing Countries: Issues and Options, TRANSPORT NOTE No. TRN-3, 3 (World Bank, Feb. 2005);
Catherine Liston-Heyes & Anthony Heyes, Regulation of the Taxi Industry: Some Economic
Background, in (DE)REGULATION ROUND TABLE 91, 102; see also PRICEWATERHOUSE, ANALYSIS OF
TAXICAB DEREGULATION & RE-REGULATION 2 (1993) (prepared for the International Taxicab
Foundation) (citing URBAN MASS TRANSP. ADMIN., I TAXICAB REG. IN US CITIES (FINAL REP.) (1983))
(defining 6 types of entry policies).
31. 35 R.C.N.Y. § 51-03 (West 2012); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 19-514(f) (2011). New York
City taxicab licenses are considered intangibles, even though the medallion is a physical oblject. See
Golden v. Winjohn Taxi Corp., 311 F.3d 513, 517 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Despite its tangible nature, a
medallion is essentially a license that authorizes its owner to operate a so-called 'medallion taxicab' or
'yellow taxicab.'); Matter of Prop. Clerk, v. Rosea, 472 N.Y.S. 2d 657, 658 (1984) ("The medallion is
of no value as physical property; its great value is as evidence that the owner has a license to use the
vehicle as a taxicab; this license is an intangible right and is not physical property."), afjd, 63 N.Y. 2d
961 (1984).
32. 35 R.C.N.Y. § 58-21 (West 2012). The TLC legalized medallion leasing in 1979 under
pressure from fleets. METRO. TAXICAB BD. OF TRADE, REPORT OF LEASING COMM. (May 12, 1978 &
Oct. 23, 1979) (on file with author); Anna Quindlen, Fleets Call Cab Leasing a Boon to the Public, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 18, 1979, at E6.
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eighty percent of the taxis on New York streets are operated using leased
medallions.33
Taxis are authorized to pick up passengers only through street hails.
Currently, medallion taxis have a monopoly throughout the City's five
boroughs on picking up passengers in this "'walk-up' market." 34 Before 1987,
yellow medallion taxis were allowed to pick up passengers through prearranged
bookings by phone as well as street hails. In the 1980s the TLC and the taxi
industry engineered a segmentation of taxi services in the City due to concerns
about the growing numbers of medallion cabs providing call-ahead service in
Manhattan and the attendant reduction in the number of cabs available for street
hails.
There are two main categories of New York medallions: corporate (or
fleet) and independent (or individual) medallions.36 Corporate medallions must
33. See SCHALLER CONSULTING, supra note 3, at 32 fig.18 (by implication). See also Horwitz
& Cumming, supra note 16 (stating that "[o]nly around 18 percent of cabs are owner-operated, putting
most medallions in the hands of big taxi fleets or brokers who simply rent them out").
Leasing fees for medallions significantly cut into driver incomes. When a driver leases a
medallion, he pays "a flat per-shift fee and keep[s] fares and tips above the lease fee and cost of
gasoline." SCHALLER CONSULTING, supra note 3, at 25. Thus the effect of the lease is to transfer much
of the risk of driving a taxi to the driver, since the owner gets paid his leasing fee regardless of how
much the driver collects in fares. BIJu MATHEW, TAXI! CABS AND CAPITALISM IN NEW YORK CITY 70
(2005). Before the recent fare increase, the New York Taxi Workers Alliance estimated that leasing fees
consumed almost 40 percent of a driver's daily gross bookings. New York Taxi Workers Alliance, 15%
Fare Raise UNow Under Review, RAISE THE FARE/FREEZE THE LEASE (2011), http://www.nytwa.org/
campaigns/raisefarefreezeleases (last visited Oct. 8, 2012).
Fees for leasing a medallion are capped by regulation. 35 R.C.N.Y. § 58-21(c) (West 2012).
Anecdotal evidence suggests that these lease caps effectively set the price for leasing, although fleets
and agents may be illegally overcharging drivers above the lease caps. RON MILLER, THE IMPACT OF
NEW NYC TAXI MEDALLIONS AND A NEW CLASS OF LICENSES FOR OUTER-BOROUGH STREET HAIL
PICKUPS, 6 (2012) (Ex. B: Aff. of Ronald Ian Miller In Supp. of Pls.' Appl. By Order to Show Cause
For TRO and Prelim. Inj., Taxicab Serv. Ass'n v. State, No. 102553 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 16, 2012))
[hereinafter MILLER]; New York Taxi Workers Alliance, STOP GARAGE/BROKER OVERCHARGES,
http://www.nytwa.org/campaigns/stopovercharges (last visited Oct. 8, 2012).
34. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 19-504(a)(1) (2011). Bruce Schaller, Entry Controls in Taxi
Regulation: Regulatory Policy Implications of U.S. and Canadian Experience, 14 TRANSPORT POLY
490, 492 (2007) (using the term "'walk-up' market" to encompass street hails and taxi stand pickups).
35. Starting in 1982 the TLC offered medallion radio cabs an incentive to take out their radios
and return to picking up hails full-time. If a medallion cab owner took out the radio, the owner would be
allowed to insert it into a newly licensed (but non-medallion) cab, and still keep the medallion cab. This
would leave the owner with two cabs rather than one: the newly licensed cab with the radio that could
pick up passengers only through prearrangement, and the now radio-less medallion cab that henceforth
could pick up only street hails. 500 Cabs Are Converted to Street Hail Duty, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1982,
at 59. The newly licensed radio cabs grew into today's black car industry.
36. The division into corporate and independent medallions dates to the establishment of
limited entry and the introduction of medallions in 1937 and has ensured that no single firm or
individual has ever monopolized the taxi industry. See infra notes 224-225 and accompanying text
(discussing the history).
When the City auctioned new medallions in the 2000s, it created new sub-categories of corporate
and independent medallions known as accessible medallions and alternative fuel medallions. New York
City, N.Y. Code § 19-532(b). An accessible medallion must be attached to a taxicab accessible to
persons with disabilities. 35 R.C.N.Y § 51-03 (West 2012) (definition of Accessible Medallion and




be owned in lots of at least two medallions, and they must be attached to
vehicles that are operated as taxis for at least 18 hours a day each. 3
Independent medallions must be owned by an owner who owns only one
medallion. 38 Also, the owner of an independent medallion acquired after
January 1990 is required to drive the vehicle to which the medallion is attached
for a minimum number of shifts per year.39 Currently, corporate medallions are
worth more than independent medallions, probably because the requirement
that owners drive independent medallions a minimum number of shifts holds
down the value of these medallions. 40
Yellow medallion taxis are the most heavily regulated sector of the New
York taxi industry. Not only is the quantity of medallion taxis restricted
through the requirement to operate with one of the limited number of
medallions, but the fares charged by yellow taxis also are prescribed through
uniform fare regulation.41 In addition, medallion taxis face extensive health,
safety and service regulation.42
2. For-hire Vehicles
There are approximately 35,340 for-hire vehicles in New York, or almost
three times as many for-hire vehicles as yellow taxis.43 The for-hire sector has
two main parts: the upmarket black car segment that serves primarily a business
clientele (8,883 vehicles) and the livery services that service upper Manhattan
compressed natural gas or a hybrid electric vehicle." 35 R.C.N.Y. § 51-03 (West 2012) (definition of
Alternative Fuel Medallion).
37. 35 R.C.N.Y. § 51-03 (West 2012) (definition of Minifleet Medallion); 35 R.C.N.Y. § 58-
20(a)(1) (West 2012) (double shift requirement for fleets and minifleets). A minifleet medallion is a
corporate medallion. Minitleets emerged when larger fleets sold off medallions starting in the late 1960s
due to high operating costs. Minifleets were corporations specially created to allow individuals to buy
two corporate medallions and operate them as independent drivers. GRAHAM RUSSELL GAO HODGES,
TAXI! A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK CITY CABDRIVER 135-37, 140-41, 150 (2007); CHARLES
VIDICH, THE NEw YORK CAB DRIVER AND His FARE 164 (1976); COMM. ON TAXI REGULATORY
ISSUES, MAYOR'S COMMITTEE ON TAXI REGULATORY ISSUES: PRELIMINARY ISSUES PAPER 30 (1981)
[hereinafter MAYOR'S COMMITTEE ON TAXI REGULATORY ISSUES] (on file with author); Edward G.
Rogoff, Theories of Economic Regulation Tested on the Case of the New York City Taxicab Industry
152-59 (1980) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University) (on file with author).
38. 35 R.C.N.Y. §51-03 (West 2012) (definition of independent medallion).
39. 35 R.C.N.Y. §58-20(a)(2) (West 2012).
40. HENNINGSON DRAFT EIS, supra note 2, at 4-32, n. 15.
41. 35 R.C.N.Y. § 58-26 (West 2012). The TLC also regulates the distribution of revenue
between taxi medallion owners and medallion lessees by establishing caps on the leasing fees that
owners can charge lessees. 35 R.C.N.Y. § 58-21(c) (West 2012).
42. See, e.g., 35 R.C.N.Y. § 67-05.1 (West 2012) (vehicle specifications); 35 R.C.N.Y. § 67-
05.2 (West 2012) (specifications for accessible vehicles); 35 R.C.N.Y. § 67-05 (West 2012)
(specifications for hybrid vehicles); 35 R.C.N.Y. § 67-18 (West 2012) (retirement dates); 35 R.C.N.Y. §
67-19 (West 2012) (retirement date exceptions); 35 R.C.N.Y. § 54-22 (West 2012) (vehicle operation
and condition).
43. Understanding the For-Hire Vehicle Industry, NYC TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMMN,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/pdf/fhv base fact sheet.pdf.
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(i.e., above 96th Street on the east side and 110th Street on the west side) and
the four outer boroughs (21,227 vehicles).44
Currently, for-hire vehicles are legally authorized to pick up only
passengers who have arranged ahead of time for service, for example by calling
ahead.4 5 Nonetheless, they often pick up street hails. Indeed, since yellow taxis
rarely travel to upper Manhattan and the outer boroughs, for-hire vehicles are
the main providers of walk-up service in these areas, where for-hire vehicles
illegally pick up "approximately 100,000 street hail trips per day" according to
the TLC.46
The for-hire sector is less heavily regulated than yellow medallion taxis.47
The number of for-hire vehicles is not limited and there thus is no requirement
to purchase or lease one of a limited number of licenses to operate a for-hire
vehicle. But entry into the for-hire sector is not completely unregulated. Drivers
and their vehicles must be licensed, and for-hire vehicles must be associated
with a licensed for-hire vehicle base.48 The number of bases is not limited, but
there are requirements for acquiring and maintaining a base license. 49 There is
no uniform fare regulation of the for-hire sector but bases must file with the
TLC rates charged to passengers by affiliated vehicles. Health and safety
regulation is also generally less onerous for for-hire vehicles.
3. Proposed Reforms
As mentioned above, yellow taxis currently have a legal monopoly on
picking up passengers via street hails throughout New York's five boroughs,
but in practice they concentrate on Manhattan's central business district and the
airports. As a consequence, the bulk of the City's population in upper
Manhattan and outer boroughs must rely on illegal pickups by community
44. Id.; HENNINGSON DRAFT EIS, supra note 2, at 4-17. Limousines are a third category of
for-hire vehicles. There currently are 5,230 limousines. NYC TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM'N, supra note
43.
45. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 19-504(a)(1), 19-507(a)(4), 19-516(a) (2011); 35 R.C.N.Y. § 55-
19(a) (West 2012).
46. Aff of David Yassky at 4, Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. Bloomberg, No. 102472 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 7, 2012) [hereinafter Yassky Affidavit] (on file with author).
47. Miller, supra note 33, at 5 ("Medallion taxis and FHVs are regulated very differently, with
medallion taxis facing a generally heavier regulatory burden.").
48. 35 R.C.N.Y. § 55-11 (West 2012). An important distinction between black cars and
liveries is that "[m]ore than ninety percent (90%) of ... [a black car vehicle base's] business . . . [must
be] on a payment basis other than direct cash payment by a [p]assenger." 35 R.C.N.Y. § 59A-03(c)(3).
49. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 19-511 to 511.1 (2011); 35 R.C.N.Y. § 59B (West 2012). There
are 485 community car service, 180 limousine, and 77 black car bases. NYC TAXI & LIMOUSINE
COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 2009, supra note 29, at 9.
50. 35 R.C.N.Y. § 59B-21(a) (West 2012).
51. For example, medallion taxi vehicles generally must be replaced every three or five years.
35 R.C.N.Y. § 67-18 (retirement dates) & § 67-19 (retirement date exceptions). There are no regulatory
requirements that livery vehicles be replaced after a certain number of years of use. The TLC recently
decided that, effective January 2015, black cars generally must be replaced every five years. 35




liveries for street hail service.5 2 The problem of inadequate yellow taxi service
in outer boroughs and upper Manhattan has been an issue in New York politics
for decades, going back at least to the 1960s.
In 2011 and 2012, in response to an initiative launched by New York
Mayor Michael Bloomberg, New York State enacted legislation authorizing the
City to legalize street pickups by non-medallion taxis in upper Manhattan and
the outer boroughs. 54 In the summer of 2012, a New York State trial judge
blocked the implementation of the Street Hail Livery Law in litigation brought
principally by medallion owners and lenders. As discussed in Part VI, the
Street Hail Livery Law and the debate about it provide support for this Article's
hypothesis that New York taxi medallions persist because of interest group
pressures, principally from medallion owners and the actors that service them,
such as the lenders that finance medallion purchases.
B. New York City Taxicab Licenses as Property
I now turn to why New York medallions are a form of private property
that can be analyzed using theories about the evolution of property.
There is a widespread sense among legal academics that there is no longer
a unified concept of property in law and scholarship.5 6 However, courts and
academics nonetheless have a standard way of defining property: property is
widely regarded as a bundle of rights.57 Under this view, property is "an
infinitely variable collection of rights, powers, and duties." Among the rights
52. Andy Soltis, Mayor Bloomberg Wants To Legalize Livery Cab Pickups in Outer Boroughs,
N.Y. POST (Jan. 18, 2011, 3:56 PM), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/mayor bloomberg wants
boroughs_ egalize_plXh4SftpAbHVOgPOKnpll.
53. See discussion infra Section VI.B.
54. 2012 N.Y. Sess. Laws 9 (McKinney) (amending 2011 N.Y. Laws 602). 1 adopt the term
"Street Hail Livery Law" to refer to the legislation from New York City's legal materials defending the
law against various legal challenges. See, e.g., Defs.' Mem. of Law in Supp. of their Mot. for Summ. J.
at 1, Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. Bloomberg, No. 102472 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 7, 2012).
55. The plaintiffs initially obtained a temporary restraining order blocking the implementation
of the legislation. Taxicab Service Ass'n v. New York, No. 102553, NYLJ 1202557349629, at *1 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. June 1, 2012). The court then granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on three grounds,
while the defendants prevailed on three grounds. Taxicab Service Ass'n v. New York, No. 102553-
2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. August 17, 2012). The defendants have asked the New York Court of Appeals to
hear an appeal directly, without a prior decision from an intermediate appellate court. As of November
9, 2012, the parties are awaiting the decision of the Court of Appeals on whether to hear the appeal
directly.
56. On the confusion about the concept, see Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration ofProperty,
in NOMos XXII: PROPERTY 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980); MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY
145-67 (1992); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Essay, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, 111 YALEL.J. 357 (2001).
57. E.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992); United States
v. Gen. Motors Corp. 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945); Merrill & Smith, supra note 56, at 365.
58. Merrill & Smith, supra note 56, at 365.
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often included in the property bundle is "the right to exclude, to use, to transfer,
or to inherit."5 9
New York taxicab medallions have many of the standard sticks in the
bundle. Individual license holders enjoy a right "to exclude others from using"
their medallions to drive taxis.6o Thus medallion owners are able to control who
uses their medallions, subject to satisfying any applicable TLC requirements.
Collectively, license holders enjoy the exclusive right to pick up
passengers on the street throughout the City.62 While the City may increase the
number of licenses enjoying that exclusive right, there are hurdles to increasing
the number of medallions that protect license holders from the dilution of
medallion values. Under the City Charter, City Council approval is required to
add additional licenses.63 In addition, auctioning medallions requires the
approval of the New York State legislature.64 No additional licenses were
added between their establishment in 1937 and 1996. The City auctioned 400
new medallions in 1996-1997,6 1,050 medallions in 2004-2008,6 and as
described below, there are now plans to auction an additional 2,000 medallions.
Nonetheless, as of November 2012 there are fewer medallions than there were
in 1937 when medallions were established.
59. Id.
60. Members of Peanut Quota Holders Ass'n v. United States, 421 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (referring to "a fisherman's ability to exclude others from using his fishing license").
61. For example, the owner may lease the medallion, but only to a "Licensed Taxicab Driver."
35 R.C.N.Y. § 58-21(a).
62. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 19-504(a)(1) (2011).
63. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 2303(b)(4) (2000). The requirement for City Council approval to
increase the number of medallions may reflect the concerns of medallion owners and the taxi drivers
union in 1971 that the newly created TLC would increase the number of medallion taxis. See Rogoff,
supra note 37, at 172.
64. The approval of the State legislature is required because auctioning medallions involves
selling them "for more than administrative costs" and "the excess [is] ... considered a tax," which must
be authorized by the State. Taxicab Serv. Ass'n v. New York, No. 102553-2012 at 20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Aug.17, 2012); see also Am. Compl. at 11, Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. Bloomberg, No. 102472
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 18, 2012) (on file with author).
65. 1995 New York State Laws ch. 359 (authorizing New York City to authorize the TLC to
sell up to 400 licenses); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 19-531 (2011) (authorizing sale of up to 400 licenses);
Andy Newman, Investing in a Taxi Permit Looks Riskier, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1998, at B3 (referring to
May 1996 auctions as "the first of three auctions that put a total of 400 more [medallions] on the
market").
66. NYC TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 2008, at 21, available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/pdf/annual report 2008.pdf. The sale of 900 new licenses was
authorized by 2003 New York State Laws ch. 63, Part I and N.Y.C. Local Law No. 51 (2003), which
authorized the sale of new taxicab licenses in accordance with state law. The sale of an additional 150
new licenses was authorized by 2006 New York State Laws ch. 535 and N.Y.C. Local Law No. 18
(2006). The two local laws authorizing the sales are reflected in N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 19-532.
67. There were 13,595 medallions in 1937 compared with 13,237 today. Edward Rogoff, The
Limitation of New, York City Taxicab Medallions: Economic Theory and Political Reality of the Haas
Law, 64:4 J. TRANSP. L., LOGISTICS & POL'y 462, 470-71 (1997). The reason that there are fewer
medallions than in 1937 is that the number dropped in the first decade after medallions were created in
1937 as owners did not "renew" the medallions, presumably because owners judged that the "medallions
were [not] worth the $10 yearly renewal fee." Id. at 471, 462; see also Rogoff, supra note 37, at 91-93.
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In addition to the right to exclude, another standard incident of private
property is the right to transfer.68 New York taxicab licenses are transferable
"by . . . [p]urchase, . . . [g]ift, . . . [b]equest, or . . . [o]peration of law."69 While
the approval of the TLC is required for transfer, the criteria for approval are
well-specified. 70 As mentioned earlier, there is an active secondary market in
which medallions are bought and sold.n
Taxicab licenses may be leased and many medallion owners lease their
medallions to taxi drivers.72 Medallions also may be pledged as collateral for
loans.73 Indeed there is an industry financing the purchase of medallions that
takes them as collateral.74  Some New York bail bondsmen regard taxi
medallions as acceptable collateral for bail . Medallions are considered marital
76property to be divided between spouses upon divorce. Medallions also are
considered assets in bankruptcy.
Taxicab licenses must be renewed every two years, but the renewal
process usually is a purely administrative matter. 8 Taxicab licenses may be
revoked but apparently only on certain grounds, such as "nonuse" for a
minimum period of time79 or "for good cause."80
As a constitutional matter, New York taxicab licenses almost certainly are
property protected by the Due Process Clause.8' An interesting question is
The City held the medallions that were returned in reserve and did not re-issue them, with one
exception. After World War 11, 183 individual owner medallions were re-issued to war veterans who had
returned them to serve in the military. These "G.I. medallions" initially were made nontransferable when
they were returned. However, in 1962 the City Council passed legislation making them transferable.
Charles G. Bennett, Aid to 141 Cabbies Voted by Council, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1962, at 43.
Of course, the total number of taxis in New York City has increased since 1937 with the addition
of thousands of for-hire vehicles. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (discussing the number
of for-hire vehicles). However, medallion taxis remain the only vehicles licensed to pick up street hails.
As a result, there are fewer vehicles licensed today to pick up street hails than there were in 1937.
68. Members of Peanut Quota Holders Ass'n v. United States, 421 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
69. 35 R.C.N.Y. § 58-43(a)(1) (West 2012); see also N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 19-504(h), 19-
512(a) (2011); N.Y.C. CHARTER § 2303(b)(3).
70. 35 R.C.N.Y. § 58-43 to 58-48 (West 2012).
71. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
72. 35 R.C.N.Y. § 58-21.
73. NYC TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM'N, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NEW YORK CITY
COUNCIL 5.
74. See infra notes 158-164 and accompanying text.
75. Telephone interviews with bail bondsmen (Feb. 23, 2012) (on file with author); e-mail
from Jonathan Home to author (July 16, 2007, 1:50 PM) (on file with author).
76. Lipan v. Lipan, 554 N.Y.S. 2d 7 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
77. In re Ciavarella, 28 B.R. 823, 824 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
78. 35 R.C.N.Y. § 58-06, 58-08 (West 2012).
79. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 19-504(g) (2011).
80. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 19-512.1 (2011); see also N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 19-506(a)
(2011).
81. In a leading article on the meaning of property for constitutional purposes, Thomas Merrill
argues that property has different meanings for procedural and substantive due process, and that the
range of interests protected as property for procedural due process is narrower than the range protected
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whether they are also protected by the Takings Clause, which safeguards a
narrower range of interests.82 There does not seem to be any case law squarely
holding that New York licenses are or are not private property under the
Takings Clause. The most extensive discussion that I have found of the status
of the licenses under the Takings Clause is in the 2012 trial court level decision
blocking the implementation of Mayor Bloomberg's reform efforts. But even
as property for substantive due process. Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property,
86 VA. L. REV. 885, 959-60, 982 (2000). However, judicial decisions provide little guidance on the
range of interests protected as property for substantive due process, "no doubt ... because substantive
due process protection of property has been modest throughout the post-World War IT era." Id. at 888.
See also id. at 894, 958-59.
I cannot find a case that squarely holds that New York taxicab licenses are property under the Due
Process Clause. It is settled law that a New York taxi driver's license, which is personal to the driver, is
property for procedural due process purposes. Nnebe v. Daus, 644 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2011); Hecht v.
Monaghan, 121 N.E. 2d 421 (1954). It is also possible to invoke substantive due process to protect a
taxi driver's license, although the chances of prevailing on a substantive due process claim likely are
slim. Padberg v. McGrath McKechnie, 203 F. Supp. 2d 261 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd, 60 Fed. Appx. 861
(2d Cir. 2003) (analyzing substantive due process challenges to TLC suspension and revocation policy
but rejecting the challenges). There is a strong basis for considering a New York taxicab licenses
property for procedural and substantive due process given the protection afforded a taxi driver's license,
and because a New York taxicab license has more of the standard characteristics of property than taxi
driver's license, such as transferability. Indeed, United States v. Turoff 701 F. Supp. 981 (E.D.N.Y.
1988) suggests that due process applies to New York taxicab licenses, citing two cases about drivers'
licenses. Id. at 987. It holds that New York taxicab licenses are property under the mail fraud statute. In
analyzing the legal character of the licenses, the court states that "[i]t would not be seriously disputed
that a taxicab 'license' is, accurately speaking, a special franchise which is not revocable at will and may
not be taken away except by due process." Id. at 987. While this does not cast doubt on Turoffs
statement in passing about the applicability of due process to medallions, Turoffs principal holding that
medallions are property under the mail fraud statute is no longer considered good law. Brette M.
Tannebaum, Reframing the Right: Using Theories of Intangible Property To Target Honest Services
Fraud After Skilling, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 359, 379 (2012).
Further supporting the proposition that New York taxicab licenses are property for the Due Process
Clause is that other cities' taxicab licenses and incidents of them have been held to be property for
procedural and substantive due process. South Florida Taxicab Ass'n v. Miami-Dade County., No. 00-
1366-CIV-GOLD, 00-1366-CIV-SIMONTON, 2004 WL 958073 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 24, 2006) (holding that
Miami-Dade County taxicab licenses are property for substantive due process); M & Z Cab Corp. v.
City of Chicago, 18 F. Supp. 2d 941 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that Chicago taxicab licenses and the right
to transfer them are property for procedural due process); Standard Acceptance Co. v. Lewis Cab Co.,
1996 WL 450811 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 1996) (holding that Chicago taxicab licenses are property for
procedural due process); FlowerCab Co. v. Petitte, 658 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D. 111. 1987) (holding that
Chicago taxicab licenses and the right to transfer them are property rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and moratorium on considering transfer applications violated procedural and substantive
due process); Boonstra v. City of Chicago, 214 Ill. App. 3d 379 (1991) (holding that Chicago taxicab
licenses and the right to transfer them are property rights for Fourteenth Amendment and ordinance
banning transfer violated due process). There are, however, cases holding that other cities' taxicab
licenses are not protected by due process. E.g., O'Connor v. San Francisco, 90 Cal. App. 3d 107 (1979)
(holding that San Francisco taxicab permits are not vested property rights for due process); Luxor Cab
Co. v. Cahill, 21 Cal. App. 3d 551, 558 (1971) ("The use of streets by taxicabs is a privilege that may be
granted or withheld without violating either due process or equal protection.").
82. Merrill, supra note 81, at 956-59, 982.
83. Taxicab Service Ass'n v. New York, No. 102553 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 17, 2012). The only
other judicial decision that I have found that might be regarded as addressing the status of the licenses
under the Takings Clause is Alexandre v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm'n, No. 07 Civ. 8175 (RMB),
2007 WL 2826952 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2007). The court denied a motion to preliminarily enjoin TLC
rules requiring the installation of new technology in yellow taxis on the basis that the plaintiffs are




this decision assumes that the licenses are property for takings purposes
without deciding the question, in the context of rejecting the plaintiffs' claims
that the reform efforts constitute a taking.84 Courts generally have held that
other cities' taxicab licenses are not private property under the Takings
Clause, although there is case law suggesting that Chicago taxicab licenses
are private property for takings purposes.
passing to "[p]laintiffs' property rights in their taxi medallions and vehicles" but does not further discuss
whether they are private property for takings purposes and in any event holds that plaintiffs are unlikely
to succeed in their takings claim. Id. at *8.
84. Taxicab Service Ass'n v. New York, No. 102553, at 30 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. August 17, 2012)
("Plaintiffs claim . . . that medallions are 'more than mere licenses. Because they create consistent
streams of income, have lasting residual value, and are freely transferable, they have long been
understood to be valuable property.' Let us assume that this is so. They are still 'intangible' property.
Plaintiffs intangible rights are not being 'taken,' they are being shared.").
85. Steve Oxenhandler, Taxicab Licenses: In Search of a Fifth Amendment Compensable
Property Interest, 27 TRANsP. L.J. 113, 132 (2000) ("[T]he vast majority of states do not consider a
taxicab license a Fifth Amendment compensable property interest."). For a case from New York State,
see Gluck v. City of Syracuse, 244 A.D. 2d 873 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997 (holding that Syracuse airport
taxicab medallions are not property under the Takings Clause). Minneapolis Taxi Owners Coalition, Inc.
v. Cay of Minneapolis, 572 F.3d 502 (8th Cir. 2009) is a recent case from a U.S. Court of Appeals that
considers not whether a taxicab license is property under the Takings Clause, but the related issue of
whether the market value of numerically limited taxicab licenses is protected by the Takings Clause. The
decision holds that the interest that Minneapolis taxicab license holders had in the market value of their
licenses was not property protected by the Takings Clause. The case arose after Minneapolis decided to
issue an unlimited number of taxicab licenses, a move that would eliminate the value of the existing
limited number of licenses.
86. M & Z Cab, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 946 (holding that "plaintiffs have a constitutionally
protected property interest in . . . taxicab medallions" for procedural due process and later reviewing
plaintiffs' takings claim without analyzing whether plaintiffs have a property right for takings purposes
(citing Boonstra, 214 111. App. 3d at 386-87 and Flower Cab Co., 658 F. Supp. at 1176)); Boonstra, 214
Ill. App. 3d at 387,(holding that Chicago "taxicab license and its assignability is constitutionally
protected property interest pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment" and that ordinance banning transfer
of medallions "constituted a taking of property without due process and without just compensation").
Boonstra and M & Z Cab are problematic because they treat Chicago taxicab licenses as property for
due process and takings purposes, without separately considering whether they are private property
under the Takings Clause. While the Supreme Court has not articulated a test for "private property"
under the Takings Clause, it is clear that the Takings Clause protects a narrower range of interests than
the Due Process Clause. Merrill, supra note 81, at 956-59, 982. Boonstra and M & Z Cab are therefore
questionable in using the same concept of property for due process and takings purposes. Notably, the
Eighth Circuit recently refused to follow Boonstra in Minneapolis Taxi Owiners, 572 F.3d at 507 n.4,
although not because the Takings Clause safeguards a narrower range of interests than the Due Process
Clause.
Case law from the Federal Circuit provides a possible framework for analyzing whether
"intangible property such as government issued permits and licenses" like New York taxicab licenses
are private property under the Takings Clause. Members of Peanut Quota Holders Ass'n v. United
States, 421 F.3d 1323, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Mark Fina & Tyson Kade, Legal and Policy
Implications of the Property Right Status of Catch Shares, WASH. J. ENVT'L L. & POL'Y (forthcoming)
(on file with author) (applying Federal Circuit case law to fishery catch shares). As explained in
Members of Peanut Quota Holders Association, "a compensable interest is indicated by the absence of
express statutory language precluding the formation of a property right in combination with the presence
of the right to transfer and the right to exclude." 421 F.3d at 1331. To my knowledge there is no
statement in the City Charter, Administrative Code, or Rules precluding the formation of property rights
in New York medallions. Existing case law provides a guide to the language that might be held to
preclude the formation of a cognizable property right. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S 488, 489, 494
(1973); American Pelagic Fishing Co., L.P. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Conti v. United States, 291 F.3d 1334, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002). As mentioned above, taxi medallions are
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Even though New York taxicab medallions might not be protected as
private property under the Takings Clause, it is important to remember that
they function like private property. They not only have many of the standard
incidents of private property, but they are regarded by many observers and
referred to in common parlance as property.87  Seventy-five years after
medallions were established, entities with a web of interests use, buy, sell,
lease, finance, and lend against them on the assumption that medallions are
property. The uses to which medallions routinely are put illustrates that whether
an item is classified as private property for takings purposes is not as relevant
as legal observers may be tempted to assume. The evolution of medallions
underscores the potential for items to come to be regarded and treated as
property absent the benefit of a clear constitutional guarantee against
governmental expropriation without just compensation.
111. Theories of the Evolution of Property
Having established in Part 11 that New York medallions are a form of
private property, this Part analyzes well-known explanations of why property
emerges and develops, and outlines the theory of the evolution of property that
transferable. See supra note 69. The Federal Circuit interprets the right to exclude in relation to licenses
as follows: "So long as the government retains the discretion to determine the total number of licenses
issued, the number of market entrants is indeterminate. Such a license is by its very nature not exclusive
. . . . [An existing licensee cannot] exclude later licensees from entering the market, increasing
competition, and thereby diminishing the value of his license." Members of Peanut Quota Holders
Ass 'n, 421 F.3d at 1334. Medallions likely would not entail a sufficiently robust right to exclude under
this understanding to constitute private property because the City Council retains the authority to
increase the number of medallions.
For another approach to assessing whether taxicab licenses are private property, see Oxenhandler,
supra note 85, which argues that the key factors are various aspects of the nature of the regulatory
system and the industry's expectations. See also David Seth Zlotlow, Note, Broadcast License Auctions
and the Demise of Public interest Regulation, 92 CAL. L. REV. 885 (2004) (applying Oxenhandler's
framework to broadcast licenses).
Even if medallions were deemed private property protected by the Takings Clause, medallion
owners still might not gain much judicial protection against government regulation. Assuming that the
alleged taking of licenses would not fall under a categorical rule and would be classified as a regulatory
taking, the framework established in Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New, York would
be used to determine whether compensation was due. 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978). A central issue
likely would be whether the challenged government action deprived the license holders of reasonable
investment-backed expectations, one of the Penn Central factors. Id. at 124. The Supreme Court and
lower courts have held that actors in highly regulated industries bear the risk of shifts in regulation
because the significant degree of pre-existing regulation means that industry participants have no
reasonable expectation that the regulatory context will not change. Zlotlow, supra, at 902; see also Fina
& Kade, supra, at 23-24 (discussing the Federal Circuit's approach to investment-backed expectations).
In 1997 a New York State intermediate appellate court denied a takings claim brought by Syracuse
airport taxicab license holders after the City abandoned the licensing scheme partly on the basis that they
did not have "'investment-backed expectations' that had to be compensated" because the ordinance
authorizing their licenses granted "the Chief of Police . . . full discretion to determine the number of
medallions." Gluck, 244 A.D. 2d at 874; see also M & Z Cab, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 952 (rejecting plaintiffs'
takings claim partly because they had "notice of the conditions under which their medallions may be
revoked").
87. See, e.g., Editorial, Take 1,800 More Taxis and Run, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1987, at A18




undergirds the Article's analysis of the persistence of New York taxi
medallions.
A. Demsetzian Theories
There is no shortage of theories of why private property exists.88
However, reflecting the rise of law-and-economics in legal scholarship, the
dominant explanations for the existence of private property in legal academia
are economic ones.
In a highly influential 1967 article, Harold Demsetz offered a broad
formulation of the economic explanation of private property, arguing that it
arises because its benefits exceed its costs from a societal perspective. 89 The
costs of private property usually are assumed to include the cost of measuring
the object that is to be the subject of private property, such as surveying the
land or water, and the cost of distributing the rights, such as the cost of titling
the property owners. Theorists working in the Demsetzian framework attribute
different benefits to private property.
Demsetz argues that private property exists because it has the benefit of
internalizing externalities, such as environmental externalities. 90 He identifies
two ways that private property performs this function. First, it concentrates in
the owner the benefits and costs of resource use.91 Without private property,
individuals have little incentive to take care of resources because they are not
certain that they will reap the benefits of their stewardship. By granting owners
the ability to exclude others, private property assures owners that they will
benefit from their stewardship. Owners also pay a price for poor resource use,
which causes property values to decline.
88. Some offer Lockean explanations according to which individual labor gives rise to
entitlements recognized in private property. For two very different contemporary invocations of Locke,
see Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property, 64 WASH.
U. L. Q. 667 (1986); and Eric R. Claeys, Locke Unlocked: Productive Use in Trespass, Adverse
Possession, and Labor Theory (Feb. 21, 2012) (unpublished working paper) (on file with George Mason
University Law & Economics Research Paper Series), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1759551.
Others point to Hegelian considerations, emphasizing that individuals require property in order to fully
develop as persons. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982).
89. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. EcoN. REV. 347, 350
(1967) ("[T]he emergence of new property rights takes place in response to the desires of the interacting
persons for adjustment to new benefit-cost possibilities."). On the impact of Demsetz's 1967 article, see,
for example, ITAl SENED, THE POLITICAL INSTITUTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 34 (1997); Bell &
Parchomovosky, supra note 15, at 83; James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property
Rights, 95 CORNELL L. REv. 139 (2009); and Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and
the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S331, S331 (2002). A counterpoint to the general
embrace of Demsetz's framework is Daniel Fitzpatrick's argument about the limits of explaining the
evolution of property rights in cost-benefit terms, which draws on examples from the Third World.
Daniel Fitzpatrick, Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The Third World Tragedy of
Contested Access, 115 YALE L.J. 996 (2006).
90. Demsetz, supra note 89, at 348, 350.
91. Id. at 355. See also Krier, supra note 89, at 141 (outlining Krier's explanation of this
argument).
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The second way that Demsetz suggests that private property internalizes
externalities is by facilitating negotiations to contain externalities that are not
internalized because of the scale of the asset that is owned.92 Divvying up
assets among owners will not completely internalize externalities because
owners may use their assets in ways that affect other owners. Demsetz again
offers an environmental example, a landowner who builds a dam on his land
that reduces the amount of water available to his downstream neighbor. 93
Private property facilitates addressing this sort of remaining externality because
private property reduces the number of persons with whom the affected
neighbor must negotiate to limit the effects of the dam.94 Under open access,
the affected landowner would have to negotiate with any of the individuals who
might build or operate the dam because there would no owner who could
exclude anyone from the area.95 Indeed, the dam might not be built in the first
place under open access because no one would have an incentive to invest in
building the dam given the inability to exclude others from reaping its
benefits. 96
As argued in Part IV, the persistence of New York taxi medallions in
theory might be explained as an effort to internalize environmental
externalities, although not through either of the ways that Demsetz delineates.
Taxis generate air pollution and contribute to congestion. 97 In theory, the
number of medallions could be set at a level that reflects a socially optimal
level of pollution and congestion from taxicabs. Requiring that taxis have a
medallion to operate could be considered a way of forcing taxi drivers to bear a
cost for the pollution and congestion that they generate, since drivers must
either buy or lease a medallion to put a taxi on the road. The medallion system
might be analogized to the cap-and-trade programs sometimes used to control
air pollution. 98 These programs involve the distribution of a limited number of
permits that are tradable like taxi medallions. Polluters are required to hold
92. Demsetz, supra note 89, at 356-57. Krier argues that this second argument about how
private property internalizes externalities is "Demsetz's distinctive contribution." Krier, supra note 89,
at 141. Demsetz's argument is further elaborated in Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE
L.J. 1315, 1322-32, 1334-35 (1993), which distinguishes small, medium and large events, and refers to
Demsetz's example of the building of a dam as a medium event.
93. Demsetz, supra note 89, at 356.
94. Id. at 356-57. Demsetz explicitly compares private property to "communal property," but
in using the term communal property, he seems to have in mind an open access situation where the
number of users of a resource cannot be limited. See id. at 354. As Krier argues, Demsetz ignores the
possibility of what Carol Rose calls a limited common property regime under which a group excludes
outsiders from the resource while allowing its members to use the resource. Krier, supra note 89, at 144;
Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folktales, Emission Trades and
Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 155 (1998).
95. Demsetz, supra note 89, at 357.
96. Id. at 356.
97. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
98. See Matt Thoman & Ike Brannon, Taxi Medallions Coming to a City Near You, REG. 4
(Spring 2012) (comparing taxi medallion system proposed for Washington, D.C. to "a cap-and-trade
program for taxis, but with no high-minded public purpose").
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permits to emit, much like taxi drivers must have medallions to operate. The
requirement to hold permits to pollute imposes a cost on polluters, similar to
the cost taxi drivers incur in a medallion system. In emissions trading
programs, polluters either pay outright to buy the permits, or if polluters
acquire the permits for free in the initial government-run distribution they pay
an implicit price by holding onto the permits and forfeiting the profits that they
might receive from selling them.
Another benefit that Demsetz and others have attributed to private
property is lower costs of enforcing obligations. 99 Demsetz points out that
private property reduces "policing costs" because, compared with an open
access situation, it reduces the number of people whose behavior must be
monitored.oo As Robert Ellickson observes, "self-control by one person ... by
means of his own central nervous system is much simpler than the multiperson
coordination entailed in intragroup monitoring."' 0' Private property still
requires an owner to monitor to ensure that no one trespasses upon and upends
the management of the resource he now owns.102 But the owner likely has a
greater incentive to monitor for compliance than the members of a large group
because the owner stands to reap the entire benefits of his stewardship of the
resource while each group member would enjoy only a share of the benefits.103
Furthermore, the owner must only monitor for incursions by outsiders, which
are simpler to observe than the breaches in behavior that the members of a large
group have to watch for to enforce an agreement. 104
In addition to reducing the number of people whose behavior must be
monitored, property may lower enforcement costs by acting as a bond that
promotes compliance.10 5 A person with property may have a greater incentive
to fulfill his obligations to others, including complying with government
regulations, than someone without property because the property owner faces
99. See Demsetz, supra note 89, at 356. Other scholars, including Ellickson, supra note 92,
have further elaborated the point. See generally KOMESAR, supra note 14, at 127-29 (arguing that
Demsetz's and Ellickson's economic theories justify private property and predict that it will develop
because it entails lower monitoring costs than common property).
100. Demsetz, supra note 89, at 355.
101. Ellickson, supra note 92, at 1327.
102. Id. at 1327 (suggesting that "Demsetz incautiously implied that an individual landowner
is entirely free of the burden of monitoring others' behavior within the borders of his parcel").
103. Id. at 1328 n.43 (citing personal correspondence with Demsetz).
104. Id. at 1327. See also Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management
Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 20 (arguing that it is less costly to monitor for the
presence of trespassers than to monitor for compliance with standards of conduct).
105. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 54-56 (2000). On the function of bonds, see David Charny,
Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373, 392-97 (1990); Ronald J.
Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing Transactions, 87 GEo. L.J. 2225, 2229-37 (1999); and
Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages To Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON.
REV. 519 (1983). See also Larissa Katz, Governing Through Owners: How and Why Formal Private
Property Rights Enhance State Power, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 2029 (2012) (arguing that formal property
rights make owners more vulnerable to state-imposed burdens).
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the potential loss of his property for non-fulfillment. As Hernando de Soto
explains, formal property rights make owners accountable by giving them
"property to lose."1 06
As discussed in Part IV, the persistence of New York taxi medallions
theoretically might be explained on the basis that they reduce enforcement
costs for reasons similar to the two just described. The medallion system limits
the number of taxis and therefore the number of vehicles that the City must
ensure comply with fare, health and safety regulations. Medallions also may
reduce enforcement costs by providing a group of actors in the taxi industry-
medallion owners-with incentives to ensure that taxi vehicles comply with
these regulations. Medallion owners could be fined and potentially lose their
medallions if they fail to ensure that their medallions are used in conformity
with government requirements.
Part IV argues that the persistence of New York taxi medallions cannot be
explained in Demsetzian terms as an effort to internalize externalities or reduce
enforcement costs and Part V offers a political economy explanation instead.10 7
Aside from their deficiencies in explaining taxi medallions, it is worth
underscoring a general weakness of Demsetzian explanations that further
justifies resorting to a political economy explanation. Notwithstanding their
prevalence, it is widely recognized that the Demsetzian explanations for private
property are better regarded as justifications for private property, rather than
explanations of the mechanisms by which private property comes into existence
or persists. That is because these explanations do not actually explain the way
private property comes into being, evolves, or remains in place. Rather, they
identify the potential benefits of private property. 108
In attempting to identify a mechanism by which private property evolves,
some have argued that property develops organically within society and have
used game theory to buttress their arguments. 109 Demsetz implied that property
106. DE SOTO, supra note 105, at 56.
107. It is interesting to note that Demsetz discusses taxi medallions as a barrier to entry in
analyzing the difficulties with various economic definitions of barriers to entry. Harold Demsetz,
Barriers to Entry, 72:1 AM. ECON. REV. 47, 48 (March 1982).
108. See, e.g., Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of
Private Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117, 121 n.5 (2005) (citing sources referring to the lack of
discussion in Demsetz, supra note 89, about the mechanism by which private property evolves).
Demsetz himself has suggested that his 1967 article was not intended to explain the mechanism by
which property evolves, but rather to explain why private property exists. Harold Demsetz,
Frischmann's View of "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," 4:1 REV. L. & ECON. 127, 127 (2008)
("My general intent when writing 'Toward a Theory ...' was to explain the emergence of private
property rights."); id. at 129 ("1 did avoid the different, difficult problem of how property right
adjustments are actually made. I would still be working on the article were I to have undertaken this
task."). Krier discusses Demsetz's clarification of his purpose in his 1967 article in Krier, supra note 89,
at 143, n.16 and accompanying text.
109. Wyman, supra note 108, at 122. For an insightful analysis of "invisible-hand"
explanations of the emergence of private property that traces the use of game theory to buttress these
explanations, see Krier, supra note 89, at 150-57. Krier distinguishes "intentional" and "unintended-




emerges spontaneously within society without central coordination, although he
did not use game theory to bolster the idea that property might be able to
emerge through an invisible hand. 10 Ellickson has used game theory to suggest
that "land rules within a close-knit group evolve so as to minimize its
members' costs"111 without "a conscious collective decision."11 2 Ellickson is
careful to emphasize that his prediction about property law evolving
organically toward efficiency applies only to land rules generated by close-knit
groups, and not like Demsetz's argument to land law in general. 13
A serious difficulty with arguing that private property is the product of an
invisible hand is that this type of explanation downplays the fundamental role
of the state in intentionally creating and maintaining private property." 4 The
state's role is especially evident in the case of the "new property" established
by the administrative and regulatory state in the twentieth century, such as
taxicab licenses. But the state also historically has played an important role in
the development of older forms of private property, such as real property. For
example, the origins of many real property rights in the United States lie in
colonization of the country by foreign powers, and the displacement of Native
Americans by these powers and successive American governments.115 Today,
the state continues to play an important role in shaping real property rights by
establishing the kinds of rights that can be held in land through legislation and
regulation, most prominently land use planning and zoning.
110. See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 89, at 350 ("It is my thesis in this part of the paper that the
emergence of new property rights takes place in response to the desires of the interacting persons for
adjustment to new benefit-cost possibilities."); id. ("[A]djustments in property rights .... have arisen in
Western societies largely as a result of gradual changes in social mores and in common law precedents.
At each step of this adjustment process, it is unlikely that externalities per se were consciously related to
the issue being resolved. These legal and moral experiments may be hit-and-miss procedures to some
extent . . . ."). There are places where Demsetz could be interpreted as suggesting that private property
might emerge through conscious societal decisions. Id. ("I do not mean to assert or to deny that the
adjustments in property rights which take place need to be the result of a conscious endeavor to cope
with new externality problems."). See also Krier, supra note 89, at 147 (discussing the ambiguity in
Demsetz's article about whether property arises spontaneously or by design). However, Demsetz seems
to be more commonly interpreted as offering an invisible hand type explanation for the emergence of
private property. E.g., Adrian Vermeule, Essay, The Invisible Hand in Legal and Political Theory, 96
VA. L. REv. 1417, 1422 (2010) (characterizing Demsetz as offering an invisible-hand
justification/explanation for property rights).
111. Ellickson, supra note 92, at 1320 (emphasis omitted).
112. Id. at 1366. For Ellickson's invocation of game theory, see id. at 1365-66.
113. Id. at 1320. Ellickson defines a close-knit group as "a social entity within which power is
broadly dispersed and members have continuing face-to-face interactions with one another." Id.
114. Wyman, supra note 108, at 122.
115. See Reich, supra note 20, at 778-79 (stressing that old property, like new property, was
created by states, in arguing that new property should be protected like old property); see also Joseph
William Singer, Original Acquisition ofProperty: From Conquest & Possession to Democracy & Equal
Opportunity, 86 IND. L.J. 763, 766 (2011) ("[T]he title to almost every parcel of land in the United
States" begins with "conquest.").
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B. Political Economy Theories
Recognizing the state's role in the evolution of private property is only the
first step in more fully understanding the mechanisms by which property
evolves and is sustained. The next step is using positive political theory to
better understand the forces that shape the way that the state operates. As
positive political theory suggests, and a growing body of property scholarship
recognizes, the state is a vehicle through which individuals and groups act to
create, maintain and transform property rights. 1 Moreover, which individuals
and groups ultimately are able to achieve their objectives through state action is
influenced by demand- and supply-side factors.117
Key considerations influencing the demand for state action include the
size and the distribution of the benefits that state action stands to confer on
different groups. Groups standing to gain or maintain significant benefits likely
will be more intensely motivated to participate in the political process to obtain
or preserve these benefits. Another important demand-side consideration is the
organizational and informational costs that individuals and groups face in
attempting to obtain state action. Groups that can easily and cheaply mobilize
their members are more likely to succeed in the political process.
The institutions through which the state supplies policies also impose
decision-making costs that may influence policy outcomes.118 For example,
private property may be harder to establish, or to change, when the state
institutions responsible for it include multiple decision-makers than when
decision-making is concentrated in a single individual or a hierarchically
organized agency. The time and effort required to reach a decision likely will
be greater when the approval of more actors is required, especially when the
actors have different preferences. 119
Like Demsetzian explanations for private property, then, positive political
theory explanations focus on the costs and benefits of private property. The two
116. For property scholarship recognizing the importance of the state and interest groups in
the evolution of property, see generally, for example, GARY LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY
RIGHTS (1989); Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Property Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S359 (2002);
Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking on Public Roads, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
S 1515 (2002); Levmore, Property's Uneasy Path, supra note 15; Levmore, Tvo Stories, supra note 15;
and Wyman, supra note 108. See also Wyman, supra note 108, at 122-23 n.10 for additional examples
of scholarship about the evolution of property that analyzes the evolution as a political process.
117. For a helpful overview of the factors intluencing government decision-making on which I
draw in the following discussion, see KOMESAR, supra note 14, at 30, 60-67, 70, 114. Komesar also
distinguishes between "demand" and "supply" considerations. See, e.g., id. at 3-10 (chapter titled
"Supply and Demand"); id. at 26 (referring to "demand-side analyses" and "the supply side of the law-
the courts").
118. Buchanan and Tullock define decision-making costs as "only the estimated costs of
participating in decisions when two or more individuals are required to reach agreement." JAMES M.
BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 45-46 (1962). 1 explore the implications of political institutions for the
development of private property in Wyman, supra note 108, at 129-35, 176-90.
119. Wyman, supra note 108, at 134-35 n.39 and accompanying text.
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kinds of explanations differ principally in the relevant unit of analysis.
Demsetzian explanations suggest that private property exists because it is cost-
beneficial for society as a whole. Positive political theory suggests that it exists
because it is cost-beneficial for certain individuals or groups.
Part V offers a demand-side political economy explanation for New York
taxi medallions that characterizes them as an example of inefficient private
property rights that have been sustained by powerful interest groups. We
probably should not think of taxicab licenses as unique. Given the state's role
in the formation and the maintenance of private property, there are bound to be
other examples of problematic private property rights.
IV. Rejecting the Demsetzian Hypotheses
There are a number of arguments commonly invoked for limiting entry
into the taxi industry through requirements that taxicabs have one of a limited
number of taxicab licenses to operate. Below, this Article rejects two
arguments for limiting entry that echo the standard Demsetzian explanations for
private property analyzed in Part 111.120 1 argue that the persistence of New
York taxicab licenses cannot be justified on the basis that they internalize
externalities or lower enforcement costs. My arguments in this Part draw on
standard economic analyses of taxi regulation, which generally are hostile to
limiting entry to the taxi industry through mechanisms such as limited numbers
of licenses. 121
120. For a useful survey of many of the arguments for limiting entry into the taxicab industry,
see OECD, supra note 5, at 21-25.
One often mentioned argument for limiting entry that I do not analyze as an explanation for New
York medallions is that limiting entry into the taxi industry is necessary to bolster taxi driver incomes.
Historically this argument was invoked as a reason for establishing limited entry in New York. See
Rogoff, supra note 37, at 90. 1 do not assess this argument because it is a distributional rather than an
efficiency argument.
For limited entry to boost driver incomes drivers would have to be sharing in the monopoly rents
generated by limited entry, which they may not be given the costs they incur to secure medallions, such
as leasing fees. For instance, the OECD reports that there is no evidence that limited entry boosts driver
incomes compared with what they would be in a competitive market. OECD, supra note 5, at 8. See
infra notes 165-172 and accompanying text (discussing incomes of New York taxi drivers and the extent
to which the drivers share in the rents from limited entry). There also are questions about whether it
would be normatively desirable on distributive justice grounds to boost driver incomes in the first place
by limiting entry given that limited entry likely results in fewer jobs for lower-skilled workers in the taxi
industry, and hurts consumers, who may be low-income persons, by boosting fares and reducing service.
See infra note 183 (discussing the incomes of taxi passengers).
121. Economists generally argue that it is inefficient and unjust to limit entry into the taxi
industry through limited numbers of taxicab licenses like New York medallions. E.g., FRANKENA &
PAULTER, supra note 30, at 37-66. See also OECD, supra note 5, at 7; OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, THE
REGULATION OF LICENSED TAXI AND PHV SERVICES IN THE UK 2-3 (2003) [hereinafter OFFICE OF FAIR
TRADING]; Richard B. Coffman, The Economic Reasons for Price and Entry Regulation of Taxicabs: A
Comment, J. TRANSPORT EcoN. & POL'Y 288 (1977); Andreas Kopp, Summary of Discussions, in
(DE)REGULATION ROUND TABLE, supra note 30, at 155; Liston-Heyes & Heyes, supra note 30, at 105;
Adrian T. Moore & Ted Balaker, Do Economists Reach a Conclusion on Taxi Deregulation?, 3 EcoN. J.
WATCH 109, 117 (2006); Edward G. Rogoff, Regulation of the New York City Tazicab Industry, 15
CITY ALMANAC 1, 18-19 (Aug. 1980); David. J. Williams, The Economic Reasons for Price and Entry
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A. Externalities
Just as one of the standard justifications for private property is its ability
to internalize externalities, so one of the standard justifications for limiting the
number of taxis is that they generate negative externalities. The idea is
intuitive: taxis generate air pollution and congestion. But taxi drivers do not
have an incentive to fully take into account the air pollution and congestion that
they produce because most of these social costs are borne by others. To contain
Regulation of Taxicabs: A Comment, 15 J. TRANSPORT ECON. & POL'Y 105 (1980); Darryl Biggar, Why
and How Should We Regulate Raxis? 3, available at http://www.taxiindustryinquiry.vic.gov.au/ data/
assets/pdf file/0007/57733/Darryl-Biggar-roundtable-paper.pdf; PRODUCTIVITY COMM'N, REGULATION
OF THE TAXI INDUSTRY ix (1999); Memorandum from Fitzroy Lee, Deputy CFO, Office of Revenue
Analysis, and Chief Economist, Taxi Medallion Systems, to Neil 0. Albert, City Administrator,
Government of the District of Columbia (Jan. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Lee]. Legal scholarship endorsing
similar views includes Verkuil, supra note 17, at 690; and Lee A. Harris, Note, Taxicab Economics: The
Freedom To Contract for a Ride, I GEo. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 195, 197, 207, 217 (2002).
Opinion is not unanimous, though. Some economists as well as legal and other academics favor
regulating entry into the taxi industry, at least in certain contexts. GORMAN GILBERT & ROBERT E.
SAMUELS, THE TAXICAB: AN URBAN TRANSPORTATION SURVIVOR 155 (1982); Paul Stephen Dempsey,
Taxi Industry Regulation, Deregulation & Reregulation: the Paradox of Market Failure, 24 TRANSP.
L.J. 73, 116-20 (1996); Schaller, supra note 34; Chanoch Shreiber, The Economic Reasons for Price and
Entry Regulation of Taxicabs, 9 J. TRANSPORT ECON. & POL'Y 268 (1975).
There have been efforts to deregulate or liberalize the regulation of the taxi industry in the U.S.
and elsewhere. Over twenty U.S. cities experimented with deregulating or liberalizing entry and/or fares
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, during the period of the deregulation of major federally regulated
transportation industries such as airlines. Most of the U.S. jurisdictions that deregulated or liberalized
their taxi industries subsequently re-introduced regulation. This is anomalous since the major
transportation industries that were deregulated in the same period generally have not been re-regulated.
There are negative and positive assessments of the U.S. experiments with taxi
deregulation/liberalization. For more critical assessments, see, for example, DEBRA LAM ET AL., THE
SAN FRANCISCO TAXICAB INDUSTRY: AN EQUITY ANALYSIS 8 (2006); PRICEWATERHOUSE, supra note
30, at 1, 8; Schaller, supra note 34, at 494; and Roger F. Teal & Mary Berglund, The Impacts of Taxicab
Deregulation in the USA, 21 J. TRANSPORT EcoN. & POLY 37, 42 (1987). For a more positive
assessment, see, for example, OECD, supra note 5, at 35. One lesson of the U.S. experiments, which
often increased the number of taxis on city streets but also produced higher fares, may be that there is a
strong justification for regulating the amount of taxi fares, even when there is no regulatory cap on the
number of taxis. Kopp, supra, at 161; OECD, supra note 5, at 9, 20, 43-45.
Ireland and New Zealand have had positive experiences with taxi deregulation. In Ireland, entry
but not fare restrictions were removed in 2000 and many new taxis appeared on city streets. Sean D.
Barrett, Regulatory Capture, Property Rights and Taxi Deregulation A Case Study, in
(DE)REGULATION OF THE TAXI INDUSTRY ROUND TABLE 133, 148 (Organisation For Economic Co-
operation and Development, European Conference of Ministers of Transport, Transport Research Centre
2007) [hereinafter Barrett, Regulatory Capture]; OECD, supra note 5, at 35; Sean D. Barrett, The
Sustained Impacts of Taxi Deregulation, 30:1 ECON. AFF. 61 (2010). New Zealand significantly relaxed
entry and fare restrictions in 1989 and experienced greater availability of service and fare reductions.
OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra, at 68; OECD, supra note 5, at 36. Experiences in the Netherlands,
Norway and Sweden are portrayed in mixed terms. OECD, supra note 5, at 36 (discussing the
Netherlands and Sweden); OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra, at 37 (discussing Sweden); id. at 68
(discussing the Netherlands and Norway); OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, IMPACT OF TAXI MARKET
REGULATION-AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON, ANNEXE J 1, 92 (2003) [hereinafter OFFICE OF FAIR
TRADING ANNEXE J] (discussing Sweden); Peter Bakker, Deregulation of the Taxi Industry: Experiences
in the Netherlands, in (DE)REGULATION ROUND TABLE, supra note 30, at 59 (discussing the
Netherlands). On the UK's experience, see OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra, at 4; OFFICE OF FAIR
TRADING, IMPACT OF REGULATION ON TAXI MARKETS-CASE STUDY ANALYSIS, ANNEXE D (2003);
and Matteo Aquilina, Quantity De-restriction in the Taxi Market: Results from English Case Studies,
45:2 J. TRANSP. ECON. & POLY 179 (2011).
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these negative externalities from taxi driving, it is necessary to cap the overall
number of vehicles on the roads through a medallion system. 22 The cap on the
number of medallions also imposes a cost on taxi drivers because they must
either purchase or lease the medallion and this cost theoretically could be
regarded as a price for polluting and contributing to congestion.
There is no doubt that cabs contribute to congestion and pollution in the
central business district in Manhattan. According to one estimate, "[t]axicabs
comprise up to 60 percent of all vehicles in motion on Midtown avenues." 23
Congestion and pollution also have been invoked as grounds for restricting the
number of taxis. The congestion that taxicabs caused in New York's
Depression-era streets was one of the arguments given for introducing a limited
number of medallions in New York in 1937.124 In the 1980s, then-Mayor Ed
Koch abandoned a proposal to add 1,800 new medallions partly because of the
projected increase in air pollution from the additional cabs.125
However, as a normative matter there is little basis for restricting entry to
the taxi industry based on the air pollution and congestion that taxis contribute.
Air pollution and congestion are caused by vehicles in general, not just taxis.
Rather than singling out taxis through a numerical cap, governments should be
establishing targets for the allowable amounts of air pollution and congestion in
general, and regulatory programs that motivate operators of all types of
vehicles to adjust their behavior to help achieve these targets. These programs
could take the form of either pricing mechanisms (such as emission or
congestion charges), or quantity controls (which could require that any vehicle,
not just taxis, have one of a number of licenses to operate).126
122. See, e.g., Shreiber, supra note 121, at 274-75, id at 279 ("In New York City, where
taxicabs are the largest contributors to congestion and air pollution in downtown areas, elimination of
the present restrictions on entry is bound to increase the number of cabs there and therefore to bring
about further deterioration in the already heavy traffic congestion and high levels of air pollution.").
123. URBITRAN ASSOCIATES INC., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: PROPOSED
ISSUANCE OF ADDITIONAL TAXICAB MEDALLIONS 36 (Feb. 2004) (prepared for the New York City Taxi
& Limousine Comm'n), http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/pdf/env-impact statement.pdf (citing
SHALLER CONSULTING, The New, York City Taxicabs Fact Book (3d ed.)); see also Michael M.
Grynbaum, Deadliest for Walkers: Male Drivers, Left Turns, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2010, at Al ("[A]t
some times of day, [taxis] can make up nearly half of Manhattan's traffic, according to some
estimates."); Charles Komanoff, 2,000 New Medallion Taxis: A Paper in Support of "More Taxis Mean
More Traffic " (Jan. 23, 2012), available at http://www.komanoff.net/cars_11/Komanoff Taxi
Analysis.pdf (noting that medallion taxis comprise "more than two-fifths of' traffic in Manhattan's
central business district).
124. Kitch et al., supra note 17, at 324; Rogoff, supra note 37, at 90.
125. Kirk Johnson, Environmental Study Urges Limiting Rise in Cabs to 400, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 7, 1988, at BI. According to a 1976 book, "half of all mobile-source air pollution in midtown
Manhattan" was due to taxis. VIDICH, supra note 37, at 129.
126. FRANKENA & PAULTER, supra note 30, at 43 (discussing pollution arguments); Coffman,
supra note 121, at 295 ("Economic efficiency requires that any given target level of air quality or traffic
congestion be achieved in the least-cost way, which means comparing the marginal costs of externality
reduction from each source, rather than arbitrarily singling out one source for special treatment."). The
argument leaves open the possibility that in some contexts it might be economically justifiable to
attempt to reduce air pollution or congestion by limiting the number of taxis because limiting them is the
cheapest way of addressing these problems.
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Moreover, regardless of whether the number of taxis should be capped to
deal with congestion and air pollution, it is clear that New York's medallion
system for limiting entry does not exist because it manages congestion and air
pollution from taxis or vehicles in general. New York's medallion system is too
over-inclusive to be explained in this way because, in its current form, it
restricts the number of taxis that can pick up street hails throughout the City's
five boroughs and at all times of the day-not just in the parts of the City (such
as midtown Manhattan) and at the times of the day that are most congested and
polluted. The medallion system also is too under-inclusive to be explained as a
program for managing congestion and air pollution. The medallion system does
not limit the overall number of taxis in New York. Only the number of taxis
picking up street hails is capped while there is no limit on the number of for-
hire vehicles.
Furthermore, there is no basis for thinking that the current number of
medallions achieves the optimal level of congestion or air pollution from just
the taxis picking up street hails.127 The current number of taxis is the product of
a series of ad hoc decisions made over more than seven decades with little
regard for the optimal number of taxis given societal interests in minimizing
congestion and air pollution from taxis or all sources. The numerical limit
established in 1937 when medallions were created was the number of licensed
taxicabs operating when the ordinance was passed in 1937.128 The City's
decisions in the mid-1990s to auction 400 medallions' 29 and in the early 2000s
to sell another 900 medallions apparently were driven in large measure by the
desire to raise revenues for the City.130 The decision in the mid-2000s to
auction an additional 150 medallions seems to have been the product of efforts
127. See Shreiber, supra note 121, at 278 (claiming that the "number of medallions" in New
York was not "determined on the basis of what was needed to achieve economic efficiency in city
transport"); OECD, supra note 5, at 25-29 (discussing whether it is possible to theoretically define and
practically implement an optimal number of taxis using limited entry policies).
128. N.Y.C., N.Y., ORDINANCES, in Proceedings of the Board of Aldermen and Municipal
Assembly of the City of New York From January 4, to June 29, 1937, vol. 1545 (Mar. 1, 1937).
129. Richard Perez-Pena, For 53, the Promise ofAmerica Fits on a Taxicab, N.Y. TIMES, May
11, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/05/11 /nyregion/for-53-the-promise-of-america-fits-on-a-
taxicab.html. The Giuliani Administration probably also chose to auction 400 medallions in 1996-1997
because an environmental impact statement from the Koch era had analyzed the addition of 400 new
medallions, and concluded that this number would have "[n]o significant adverse air quality impacts"
although there would be adverse traffic impacts that could not be mitigated. PARSONS BRINCKERHIOFF
QUADE & DOUGLAS, INC., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, ADDITIONAL TAXICAB
LICENSES 1-8, 1-7, 1-10 (June 1989) (submitted to the NYC Taxi & Limousine Comm'n) (on file with
author). See also David Firestone, Giuliani 's Spending Plan: Revenue; Plans for Park Ads and More
Taxis Draw Fire, N.Y. TIMES, February 15, 1995, at 4 (noting that the TLC chairman Fidel F. Del Valle
"said officials chose to add 400 medallions because an earlier environmental impact study showed that
400 new cabs would not significantly harm air quality").
130. Eric Lipton, Finding the Intersection of Supply and Demand; Already Facing Demands




to increase the accessibility of the taxi fleet to people with mobility
disabilities.'
Sometimes it is argued that the number of taxis should be capped as a
second-best solution in a world where there is no general policy to deal with air
pollution and congestion from vehicles to encourage people to use more
environmentally friendly mass transit.132 But there are other ways of addressing
this substitution effect. For example, mass transit service could be improved
and made cheaper through greater subsidies.133 Moreover, taxis sometimes
complement rather than compete with mass transit by carrying passengers
between mass transit hubs, and homes and offices.134
In addition, attempting to reduce air pollution and congestion by capping
the number of cabs may counterproductively encourage greater use of private
131. 2006 Laws of New York, ch. 535; N.Y.C. Local Law No. 18 (2006); Jeremy Olshan, Taxi
Boost For Disabled, N.Y. POST, May 24, 2006, at 2; City Council, City of New York, The Transcript of
the Minutes of the Committee on Transportation, May 24, 2006, at 7 (comments of Council Member
Oliver Koppell), http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=445937
&GUID=7B982A89-1E54-4F69-9782-0D6C9CB87FFF; City Council, City of New York, The
Transcript of the Minutes of the Stated Council Meeting, May 24, 2006, at 29-30 (comments of Council
Speaker Christine Quinn), http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=445937&GUID=
7B982A89-1E54-4F69-9782-0D6C9CB87FFF. The 2003 local law authorizing the sale of 900 new
medallions had taken modest steps to improve the accessibility of the taxi fleet by requiring that a small
share of the 900 medallions be for accessible taxicabs. N.Y.C. Local Law No. 51 (2003).
The recent plan to add 2,000 medallions apparently originated in a proposal from the yellow taxi
industry to add new medallions to address Mayor Bloomberg's goal of improving street hail service in
the outer boroughs. Reply Aff. of David Yassky in Further Supp. of the City's Mot. for Summ, J. and in
Opp'n to Pls.' Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. at 3-4, Taxicab Serv. Ass'n v. New York, No. 102553 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. June 15, 2012) (on file with author) [hereinafter Yassky Reply Affidavit]. The proposal for the
City to auction additional medallions remained part of the reform package even though medallion
owners do not support the package-presumably because the sale of medallions became an attractive
way to raise revenue for the City. See David Yassky, The City's Getting Taken for a Ride, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, June 20, 2012 ("So the legislators split the Taxi and Limousine Commission-fleet compromise in
two: They authorized new yellow medallions for revenue and gave local livery drivers responsibility for
the borough service"); MILLER, supra note 33, at 6 ("It appears that the [2,000] number was determined
based on revenue projections from the sale of these new medallions that are intended to close a gap in
the City's budget."). The City currently is depending on medallion sales to address a City budget gap.
Dana Rubinstein, After Helping Blow a Hole in Bloomberg's Taxi Plan, de Blasio Suggests Repairs,
CAPITAL (June 7, 2012, 3:55 PM), http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/politics/2012/06/6007233/
after-helping-blow-hole-bloombergs-taxi-plan-de-blasio-suggests-rep.
If the City adds 2,000 medallions, traffic congestion would increase. According to the draft
environmental impact statement produced for the City, adding the 2,000 new medallions would have
"significant adverse traffic impacts" and these impacts could not be completely mitigated. HENNINGSON
DRAFT EIS, supra note 2, at ES-12-13. The new medallions would "not result in a significant adverse
impact to air quality," although greenhouse gas emissions would increase. Id. at ES-I5.
132. Shreiber, supra note 121, at 274.
133. See Coffman, supra note 121, at 296 (urging focus on "the regulated transit industry").
134. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 121, at 40 ("Since taxis are often used in
conjunction with other public transport (for example at the start and end of train journeys) or at times
when other public transport is not available, restricting taxis could even decrease other public transport
use."). In New York, taxis are especially likely to complement mass transit outside of Manhattan, where
the distances between subway stations and home may be significant. Noah Kazis, Overhaul of NYC
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cars, a key competitor for mass transit. Each taxi on the road generates a
positive externality-a reduction in waiting time that benefits taxi riders
generally. When the number of cabs is artificially constrained through a cap,
waiting times likely rise above the levels that would exist if the number of cabs
was uncapped. In turn, higher waiting times may induce people who otherwise
would take taxis to buy and use their own private cars. Having bought cars
because taxis were hard to get, car owners then may reduce their use of mass
transit as well as taxis. Thus the effect of capping the number of taxis could be
reduced levels of air pollution and congestion from taxis, but higher levels
overall because of greater use of private cars.
Again, though, regardless of whether limits on the number of taxis could
be justified to boost the use of mass transit, it is difficult to explain medallion
systems such as New York's as efforts to increase mass transit usage. I am not
aware of any evidence that the number of medallion taxis has been established
to increase mass transit usage.1 3 7 Indeed, for most of their histories, taxis and
mass transit have been regulated in an uncoordinated manner by separate
bureaucracies. 138
B. Enforcement Costs
A second justification sometimes offered for limited entry is that it
facilitates the enforcement of health, safety and fare regulations justified on
other grounds, such as information costs. When a consumer enters a taxi, he
probably would like to know that the vehicle is safe, that the driver is reliable
135. See FRANKENA & PAULTER, supra note 30, at 57-58; Liston-Heyes & Heyes, supra note
30, at 100; see also Kopp, supra note 121, at 157-58 (discussing the possibility that governments should
subsidize entry into the taxicab industry given the positive externality a greater supply of taxis generates
in the form of reduced waiting times).
136. FRANKENA & PAULTER, supra note 30, at 40; OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 121,
at 40; Richard Darb6ra, When the Regulator Acknowledges the Existence of fiTo Distinct Markets for
Taxi Services, in (DE)REGULATION ROUND TABLE, supra note 30, at 117, 127; Eckert, supra note 17, at
434; Kitch et al., supra note 17, at 325, 347-48. There is evidence suggesting that taxis help to keep
down car ownership in New York City. "A 2007 survey of yellow taxi passengers revealed that 66% of
riders believed that taxis helped them live without a car." CITY OF N.Y., PLANYC UPDATE APRIL 2011:
A GREENER, GREATER NEw YORK 93 (2011), available at hftp://nytelecom.vo.llnwd.net/ol5/agencies/
planyc2030/pdf/planyc 2011 planycfull report.pdf
137. If the City adds 2,000 medallions as currently proposed, it will be putting additional taxis
on City streets notwithstanding predictions that the additional number of cabs will increase taxi use at
the expense of other modes of travel such as mass transit. The recent environmental impact analysis
commissioned by the City of adding 2,000 medallions predicts an increase in taxi usage due to the
reduction in average waiting times from adding more taxis. HENNINGSON DRAFT EIS, supra note 2, at 4-
29; see also id. App. B: Technical Memorandum on Socioeconomic Impacts of 2,000 Additional
Medallions, at 28-35.
138. Except for a period between 1940 and 1953 when mass transit was controlled by New
York City through the Board of Transportation, New York State always has had a hand in the regulation
and operation of mass transit in the City. VINCENT J. CANNATO, THE UNGOVERNABLE CITY: JOHN
LINDSAY AND His STRUGGLE To SAVE NEW YORK 99, 106-07, 196, 535 (2001); see generally CLIFTON





and that there is insurance in case of an accident, but it is costly for the
consumer to verify this information. l39 The consumer also may be poorly
positioned relative to the driver to negotiate a fare, because the driver, given his
occupation, likely will have superior information about what constitutes a
reasonable fare.140 New York has had at least rudimentary fare and vehicular
regulation for taxis for decades, since before entry was limited in 1937.141
Limited entry may reduce the costs of enforcing health, safety and fare
regulations in two ways. First, limiting the number of taxis may make it easier
for regulators because it lowers the number of vehicles and drivers that must be
monitored.142 The idea that enforcement costs are lower if the number of taxis
is limited echoes the explanation of private property as a mechanism for
lowering policing costs.
Second, reminiscent of de Soto's argument that property promotes
accountability by giving owners something to lose, medallions may lower
139. FRANKENA & PAULTER, supra note 30, at 56-57; OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note
121, at 45; Kopp, supra note 121, at 158; Liston-Heyes & Heyes, supra note 30, at 101; Rogoff, supra
note 37, at 72-73, 77-79. In contrast, taxis usually have been regulated by the City with minimal state
involvement.
140. There are different types of fare regulation and various rationales for fare regulation. See,
e.g., FRANKENA & PAULTER, supra note 30, at 46-52, 57-63; Edward C. Gallick & David E. Sisk, A
Reconsideration of Taxi Regulation, 3 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 117, 117-18 (1987); Gwilliam, supra note
30, at 2-3; OECD, supra note 5, at 20-21; Williams, supra note 121, at 106.
The case for regulating the amount of fares would seem to be particularly strong in the walk-up
market. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, sura note 121, at 60, 64-65; Gwilliam, supra note 30, at 2, 5; Kopp,
supra note 121, at 156; Liston-Heyes & Heyes, supra note 30, at 98-99; Shreiber, supra note 121, at
271-74. However, it is possible that new technology may be undermining the case for regulating the
amount of fares even in the walk-up market. For example, fare regulation might not be necessary if a
consumer seeking to hail a cab on the street could use a smartphone to contact a central dispatch service
that would identify the cheapest available taxi closest to the consumer, and direct the taxi to the
consumer. Christian Seibert, Taxi Deregulation and Transaction Costs, 26 ECON. AFF. 71 (2006). See
also Harris, supra note 121, at 204-05, 207 (rejecting price regulation, even for street hail pickups).
There is a weaker argument for regulating the amount of fares in the prearranged market because
consumers can more easily price shop when they are calling a cab or booking on the Internet than when
they are picking up a cab on the street. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 121, at 60, 65; Coffman,
supra note 121, at 290; Gwilliam, supra note 30, at 2; Kitch et al., supra note 17, at 308-09; Schaller,
supra note 34 at 492.
141. New York established maximum fares as early as 1909, and had uniform fares by 1934.
Rogoff, supra note 37, at 58; Rogoff, supra note 121, at 1, 2, 18; Rogoff, supra note 67, at 471.
Enforcement of early fare regulations apparently "was lax." Heather Haddon, Can You Hack It? History
of the New York City Taxi Driver, N.Y. POST (Jan. 2, 2011, 10:15 AM), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/
opinion/opedcolumnists/can you hack taxi history driver nBUqlrv26mNPnYmwJKu45J. City
ordinances required that cabs be licensed as early as 1909 and by 1913 that cabs conform to certain
specifications. N.Y.C., N.Y., ORDINANCES ch. 14, art. 8 (as amended to the close of the year 1931);
Rogoff, supra note 121, at 1 (noting that 1909 "ordinances called for the Bureau of Licenses to inspect
meters and to license taxicabs").
142. FRANKENA & PAULTER, supra note 30, at 65 (implying that restricting the number of taxi
firms would reduce enforcement costs); Eckert, supra note 17, at 441-53 (arguing that monopoly
franchise rights for taxi services developed in Los Angeles because monopoly makes it easier for
regulators to regulate the taxi industry and serve franchisee's interests but emphasizing that there is no
economic justification for monopoly rights); Lee, supra note 121, at 9 (referring to, but not endorsing,
the argument for limited entry that "[r]egulators might . . . have a more manageable workload when they
implement quality regulations for taxicabs across a smaller market.").
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enforcement costs by acting as a bond that promotes compliance with
regulations. Medallions might provide their owners with a strong incentive to
ensure that their cabs comply with government regulations because the owners
could have their medallions suspended or even revoked as a penalty for non-
compliance.143 As an economic analysis prepared for New York medallion
lenders recently explained: "Valuable medallions provide an economic
mechanism for strong enforcement of regulations. A medallion owner will not
simply walk away from his medallion if faced by fines or other sanctions
because he would be losing a highly valuable asset if he were to do so." 144
As a normative matter, it is doubtful that lowering the costs of enforcing
other regulations justifies limiting the number of taxicabs. To justify limiting
entry to reduce enforcement costs, the savings generated by lower enforcement
costs would have to exceed the costs of limiting entry, such as poorer service
and higher fares.145 There also are alternatives to limited entry that could
reduce the costs of enforcing health, safety and fare regulations. For example,
regulators could require taxi vehicle owners and drivers to be associated with
organizations of vehicle drivers and owners, and these associations could be
penalized if their members fail to comply with health, safety or fare regulations.
In other words, these regulations might be enforced to some extent through a
form of collective sanction. 146
Regardless of whether medallions can be justified as lowering
enforcement costs, it is difficult to attribute their durability to any savings
143. Gallick & Sisk, supra note 140, at 127 (arguing that medallions may effectively enforce
average pricing rules, and indicating that "[t]he medallion system is very similar to bonding" with the
difference that the medallion generates "an increased average fare" rather than interest); see also
FRANKENA & PAULTER, supra note 30, at 63-64 (stating but rejecting the argument that medallions
might be justified because they may lower enforcement costs); Lee, supra note 121, at 9 (stating, but not
endorsing, the argument that medallions might lower enforcement costs by providing firms with an
incentive to comply "to avoid losing their medallion[s]"); Liston-Heyes & Heyes, supra note 30, at 103-
04 (referring to the argument that medallions act as a "de facto bond" promoting regulatory compliance
but also referring to sources rejecting the argument).
144. MILLER, supra note 33, at 3; see also Golden v. Winjohn Taxi Corp., 311 F.3d 513, 518-
20 (2d Cir. 2002) (discussing liability of medallion owners for compliance with regulatory
requirements); MILLER, supra note 33 at 4 n.7 ("The medallion owner is often not the actual driver of
the taxi . . . . However, the owner of the taxi is responsible for many fines, including some (such as
improper use of the cab) that may be the fault of the driver. Thus medallion owners have strong
incentives to guarantee that drivers abide by the rules."). The economic analysis quoted above was
prepared by Ron Miller, a vice president at NERA Economic Consulting, at the request of the Taxicab
Service Association to assess the implications of the Street Hail Livery Law. The Taxicab Service
Association "is an association of credit union lenders, which finance New York City taxi medallion
purchases by individuals, small businesses and other corporate entities." Compl. at 6, Taxicab Serv.
Ass'n v. New York, No. 102553 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 27, 2012).
145. FRANKENA & PAULTER, supra note 30, at 64.
146. In New Zealand, where entry is deregulated, taxi drivers must belong to an association.
Drivers and the associations receive demerit points when regulations are breached. The requirement to
belong to an association facilitates enforcement, albeit at the cost of somewhat restricting entry. OFFICE
OF FAIR TRADING ANNEXE J, supra note 121, at 59-60. On collective sanctions, see Daryl J. Levinson,
Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345 (2003). On other alternatives to limited entry that would




medallions may generate in enforcement costs. The TLC does not publish the
number of revocations or suspensions of medallions.147 However through a
Freedom of Information Law request, I obtained data from the TLC about the
number of medallion revocations and suspensions. The data indicate that
medallions are very rarely revoked, although suspensions are more common.148
The data about revocations is especially relevant because revocation entails the
permanent loss of the medallion, while suspension is only temporary.
The rarity of revocations reduces the likelihood that medallions promote
compliance. If there is little probability of revocation then there is little reason
to comply to avoid losing a medallion. Further undermining the idea that
medallions might be inducing compliance is that when the TLC revokes a
medallion, it allows the owner to sell the medallion and retain the proceeds
from the sale.149 The TLC's practice of allowing divestiture softens the
147. Telephone Interview with Greg Gordon, External Affairs Analyst, NYC Taxi &
Limousine Comm'n (Aug. 1, 2012).
148. 1 requested information going back as far as TLC records permit on the number of
medallion revocations and suspensions. E-mail from author to Jason Gonzalez, Assistant Gen. Counsel,
NYC Taxi & Limousine Comm'n (Aug. 1, 2012) (on file with author). The TLC provided data
indicating that medallions were revoked only 23 times between 1998 and September 2012. E-mail from
Jason Gonzalez, Assistant Gen. Counsel, NYC Taxi & Limousine Comm'n, to author (Sept. 25, 2012)
(on file with author). The TLC data indicates that there were 45,115 medallion suspensions between
1995 and October 2012. E-mail from Jason Gonzalez, Assistant Gen. Counsel, NYC Taxi & Limousine
Comm'n, to author (Oct. 5, 2012) (on file with author).
Other information suggests that revocations also were rare before 1998. For example in 1987 the
New York Times reported that "for the first time in its 16-year history, the commission recently had
'revoked' two medallions." Richard Levine, New York Cabbies Win Right to Ban Passenger Smoking,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1987 at Bl. Then-TLC Chair Gorman Gilbert is quoted in the article as stating, in
reference to revoking medallions, "If we've done it before I don't know about it." Id. A 1981 issues
paper suggests that the TLC may have revoked medallions before 1987 but that revocations were
extremely rare. MAYOR'S COMMITTEE ON TAXI REGULATORY ISSUES, supra note 37, at 84 (noting that
"[w]hile the TLC appears in recent years to have been considerably more vigorous in suspending and
revoking medallions for violations, the violator has generally been permitted to sell his medallion when
exiting the business.").
149. For discussion of the TLC's approach to revocations, for example, Oxenhandler, supra
note 85, at 155 n. 191 (when New York City "revokes a taxicab license, the owner must divest himself of
any interest in the license; however, the City never regains possession of the license" (citing Boiadjian v.
N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm'n, 663 N.Y.S. 2d 176 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). King Victor Taxi Corp.
v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm'n, 654 N.Y.S. 2d 358 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); Mystic Cab Corp. v.
N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm'n, 663 N.Y.S. 2d 539 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997))); John v. N.Y.C. Taxi &
Limousine Comm'n, 1995 WL 470341, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 1995) (noting that after the TLC
revoked a medallion, it rescinded revocation after learning secured creditors foreclosed on the medallion
and allowed creditors to sell medallion to pay the owner's debts); and Levine, supra note 148 (reporting
that the revocation of the first two medallions revoked by the TLC "was delayed for 60 days ... to
allow" the lender that financed their purchase "to sell them and recover its investment"). The TLC also
may impose a fine when it revokes a medallion. See, e.g., Taxi & Limousine Comm'n v. Virtual Cab
Corp., OATH Index No. 1280/09 (Jan. 13, 2009); Letter from Matthew W. Daus, Comm'r/Chair, to
Virtual Cab Corp. (March 13, 2009) (on file with author) (noting that two medallions were revoked with
a $1,000 fine imposed for failure to satisfy inspection requirements).
It is not clear why the TLC allows divestiture when it revokes a medallion. A 1986 memorandum
from TLC chairman Gorman Gilbert to Mayor Edward Koch suggests that at least at that time the TLC
may have ordered divestiture because it was uncertain that it had the legal authority to "revoke a
medallion without allowing an owner to sell it." Memorandum from Gorman Gilbert, Chairnuan, New
York City Taxi & Limousine Comm'n, to Honorable Edward 1. Koch, Mayor 1 (Sept. 15, 1986) (on file
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financial consequences of revocation, and to the extent that it is known among
medallion owners, reduces the threat that revocation entails.15 0
V. Political Economy Hypothesis for Taxicab Licenses
Part IV demonstrates that it is difficult to explain New York taxi
medallions in Demsetzian terms as a public interested measure to regulate
externalities or lower monitoring costs. This Part offers a political economy
hypothesis for New York's medallions, a demand-side explanation that
attributes medallions to pressures from the taxi industry and the interests that
service it.
A. A Demand-Side Hypothesis
1. Stakes
The starting point for the political economy hypothesis for the persistence
of medallions is the identity of those who win and lose under a medallion
system, and the relative stakes of these two groups in preserving and
eliminating medallions.
The most obvious beneficiaries of the persistence of medallions are
medallion owners. The best positioned among them are owners who trace their
ownership to the early years of the medallion system. New York newspapers
periodically carry stories about large fleet owners whose families have owned
medallions since the late 1930s and 1940s.152 These longstanding owners
with author). Koch had written to Gilbert urging him to investigate whether the TLC could revoke "a
medallion upon a finding that its holder has defrauded the city of income taxes which should have been
paid on revenues from the cab." Memorandum from Edward 1. Koch, The City of New York, Office of
the Mayor, to Gorman Gilbert (Aug. 28, 1986) (on file with author). Gilbert indicated that the question
of whether the TLC can "revoke a medallion without allowing an owner to sell it .... does not have a
clear legal answer." Memorandum from Gorman Gilbert, supra, at 1. The TLC currently has the legal
authority to re-issue a medallion that it has revoked if the medallion owner has "not sold" the medallion
before revocation occurs. 35 R.C.N.Y. § 65-14(a) (West 2012).
150. "Softens" is used advisedly because allowing the owner to divest the medallion and retain
the surplus proceeds does not mean that revocation imposes no costs on the medallion owner. For
example, medallion owners forced to divest would lose any unpriced future appreciation in the value of
medallions. In addition, the owners of independent medallions who drive their medallions would lose
their ability to drive a taxi as independent businesspeople.
151. See generally Lee, supra note 121, at 5 ("Those who receive medallions in the initial
round of distribution are the greatest beneficiaries. Any gains in the value of the medallions, as may
arise from an increase in demand due to market growth, accrue almost exclusively to the first owners.").
152. Corey Kilgannon, Want a Cab? He Owns the Keys, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2012 (reporting
that a fleet owned by Stanley Wissak includes 140 medallion cabs; Mr. Wissak's father's purchased "his
first medallions in 1938"); Bill Sanderson, Tycoon's Color of Money: Yellow, N.Y. POST, May 18, 1998
(Midtown Operating Corp. runs a "215-car fleet" with 169 of the 215 medallions owned by Sherman.
Sherman's "family got into the taxi business in the 1940s when Sherman's grandfather ... and some
friends invested in some medallions and a garage in Queens."); Jeremy Smerd, All Hail King Cab!,
CRAIN'S N.Y. BUSINESS (June 17, 2012, 5:59 AM), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20120617/




benefit from the fact that they acquired medallions cheaply, especially
compared to owners who entered the industry by buying medallions recently
through the City's auctions or the secondary market.153
Limited entry makes taxi operations more profitable than they would be in
an open market because restricting the supply of taxis increases taxis' "live-
time," or the proportion of the driver's shift that is spent with a paying
passenger in the car. 154 In addition, limited entry may increase profitability
because regulated fares may be higher that they would be under unlimited
entry. Where entry is limited, regulatory decisions about fare levels may take
into account the costs that portions of the taxi industry incur to comply with the
requirement to have a medallion to operate a taxi, such as the costs of buying
and leasing medallions. 5 5 Medallion values reflect "the capitalized value of the
expected future profit flows associated with protection from free market
entry." 56 On an ongoing basis medallion owners likely extract many of the
rents that limited entry creates through the leasing fees that owners charge taxi
drivers.1 5 7 Owners also are able to borrow against, sell, and bequeath their
medallions.
In addition to the medallion owners, other key beneficiaries of the
medallion system are industries that service medallion owners, such as the
agents that arrange medallion leases, the brokers that arrange medallion sales,
and the lenders that finance medallion purchases. According to one source,
"[h]is grandfather, with some high-school friends, bought six medallions in the 1940s"). See also Tim
Gray, Investing: A Lender Hopes to Profit from the New Taxi Math, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, at 38
(profiling Andrew Murstein, President of Medallion Financial, "which traces its roots to taxis his
immigrant grandfather bought nearly 70 years ago"); Michael Powell, Their Meters Keep Running, but
the Fares Barely Make Ends Meet, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2012 ("A few families have owned thousands of
cabs since the Great Depression, or shortly thereafter.").
153. MAYOR'S TAXI STUDY PANEL, RECOMMENDATIONS TO JOHN V. LINDSAY, MAYOR OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK 11 (Dec. 1966) [hereinafter MAYOR'S TAXI STUDY PANEL] ("Until 1952, a
license cost $10, plus $10 annually for renewal."). For the idea that there are three categories of
medallion owners, see Am. Compl., Metro Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. Bloomberg, supra note 64, at 12
("Purchasers of taxicab medallions include individuals and businesses that have owned their medallions
for a considerable period of time, others who purchased their medallions from existing owners at a fair
price as determined by the parties, and more than 1,000 owners who have purchased their medallions
directly from the City of New York since 1996.").
154. See Rogoff, supra note 121, at 6 (defining "live time").
155. See infra notes 178-179 and accompanying text (discussing the possible implications of
limited entry for regulated fare levels).
156. Gwilliam, supra note 30, at 3.
157. See supra note 33. Recall that perhaps over eighty percent of taxis are operating with
leased medallions. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. Independent medallions acquired since
1990 must be driven by their owners a minimum number of shifts a year but even independent
medallions may be leased. See also MILLER, supra note 33, at 4 n.7 ("The medallion owner is often not
the actual driver of the taxi-even for individually owned medallions, many shifts are generally driven
by other drivers.").
158. See also Horwitz & Cumming, supra note 16 (describing how medallion systems create
a powerful investor class, medallion owners and financiers").
We also might think of regulators as beneficiaries since limiting entry probably makes it easier
for them to deal with the taxi industry, and may provide subsequent private sector career opportunities
as lobbyists. Eckert, supra note 17; Dana Rubinstein, Cuomo 's Summit on Bloomberg 's Taxi Bill Yields
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"[m]any and probably most medallions are financed with credit." 5 9 Lending
against medallions is a big business and "[a]t present, the medallion lending
industry services approximately $5.2 billion in medallion-purchase loans."160
There is a Nasdaq-listed firm, Medallion Financial, that specializes in financing
the purchase of medallions in New York and other cities. Reputedly "the
largest taxi lender," 162 Medallion Financial "says it has $1 billion in assets."1 6 3
Other lenders include credit unions, four of which currently "hold more than $2
billion" in medallion-purchase loans. 164
Taxi drivers benefit from the medallion system to the extent that they are
able to share with the owners the rents that limited entry creates.165 From the
mid-1960s until the late 1970s or the early 1980s, New York taxi drivers were
unionized.166 The union seems to have supported limited entry, which likely
the Promise of Maybe More Talks, At Least, CAPITAL (Nov. 4, 2011, 5:50 PM),
http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/politics/2011/11/4019245/cuomos-summit-bloombergs-taxi-bill-
yields-promise-maybe-more-talks- (noting that former TLC chairs represent a bank that finances
medallion purchases and medallion owners).
In addition, mass transit operators might be considered beneficiaries since controlling the supply
of taxis may increase demand for mass transit. Indeed, mass transit operators lobbied for limits on the
number of taxis in a number of cities in the early twentieth century. Kitch et al., supra note 17, at 316-
18; AMERICAN ELECTRIC RAILWAY ASSOCIATION, A.E.R.A. BULLETIN No. 389: A NATION-WIDE
SURVEY OF TAXICAB REGULATION 2-3 (Apr. 1, 1932) (on file with author). But mass transit authorities
probably are not major winners from limits on the number of taxis today. As mentioned above, taxis
complement as well as compete with mass transit. Moreover, limits on the number of taxis may increase
the numbers of private cars, mass transit's main competitor. See supra notes 134-136 and accompanying
text.
159. MILLER, supra note 33, at 12. See also Am. Compl., supra note 64, at 29 ("[T]he
majority of medallion owners have outstanding loans.").
160. Aff of Richard Kay in Supp. of Pls.' Appl. by Order to Show Cause for TRO and Prelim.
Inj. at 2, Taxicab Serv. Ass'n v. New York, No. 102553 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 16, 2012) [hereinafter Kay
Affidavit] (on file with author).
161. For Investors, MEDALLION FINANCIAL GROUP, http://www.medallionfinancial.com/
investors.htm ("The common stock of Medallion Financial Corp. began publicly trading on the
NASDAQ National Market on May 23, 1996 under the symbol TAXI.") (last visited Nov. 23, 2012);
Form 10-Q for Medallion Financial Corp (Nov. 7, 2012), http://biz.yahoo.com/e/121107/taxil0-q.html
(referring to medallion loans in New York, Chicago, Newark, Boston, and Cambridge) (last visited Nov.
23, 2012).
162. Andrew Grossman, Medallion Owners Fear Speed Bump, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2011, at
A19.
163. Michael M. Grynbaum, On Taxi Measure, Father's Industry Role May Create a Conflict
for Cuomo, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2011, at A22. See also Form 10-Q, supra note 161 (identifying total
assets under management).
164. Kay Affidavit, supra note 160, at 2. The four credit unions are Lomto FCU, Melrose
Credit Union, Montauk Credit Union, and Progressive Credit Union.
165. Before the recent fare increase, the TLC estimated that taxi drivers were earning $30,000
to $40,000 annually. E-mail from Greg Gordon, External Affairs Analyst, NYC Taxi & Limousine
Comm'n, to author (Aug. 2, 2012) (on file with author).
166. Damon Stetson, Taxi Union Wins Vote in 28 Fleets, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1965, at 32;
Damon Stetson, Union of Cabbies Backed By Mayor, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1964, at 27. The union
represented not only the drivers working for fleet owners, but also "2,100 of the city's 2,900
independent owner-drivers." Emanuel Perlmutter, Owners Call 15c Increase in Taxi Fares Insufficient,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1968, at 1. It helped the independents organize after the union organized the fleet
drivers. Cab Union Formed By Independents, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1967, at 20. The union negotiated
collective agreements with the Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade. By the mid-1980s, the union was
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enabled the union to extract higher wages and benefits from the fleet owners
than the drivers would have obtained on the free market.167 Today, in the
absence of a union, the main organization representing drivers is the New York
Taxi Workers Alliance (NYTWA).168 The main mechanism through which the
NYTWA and drivers can ensure they obtain a share of the rents created by
limited entry is through the caps on leasing fees that the TLC sets that limit the
amounts that medallion owners can charge for leasing medallions.169 The lease
caps function like a mini-collective agreement, allocating the rents of limited
entry between medallion owners and taxi drivers who lease medallions,
especially when as now the lease caps are "binding" and determine leasing
fees.o70 Recently, the NYTWA scored a significant victory when the TLC voted
to increase taxi fares and to allocate the fare increase largely to drivers, by
granting the medallion owners only a tiny increase in the lease cap.1' Drivers
have not done as well in past fare increases, which have been accompanied by
increases in the lease caps benefitting medallion owners.
Consumers bear significant costs from limited entry. New York has
many of the problems with taxi service that commonly afflict cities that limit
no longer a force in the industry although it continued to collect dues from tleet drivers until 1998.
HODGES, supra note 37, at 137-40, 148; MATHEW, supra note 33, at 25, 207 n.2.
167. The union and the tleet owners opposed Mayor John Lindsay's proposals in the late
1960s and early 1970s to increase the number of medallions by re-issuing medallions that the Police
Department held in reserve. Cab Union Formed By Independents, supra note 166; Peter Millones,
Finding a Cab Is Still Hard, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1967, at 49; Rogoff, supra note 37, at 172. They also
defended the medallion monopoly against threats from the "gypsy cabs." Gypsy Cahs: Why the Men
Who Drive Yelloivs Are Seeing Red, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1971, at E4; Maurice Carroll, Union Leaders,
at City Hall, Oppose a Taxi Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1971, at 1; Frank J. Prial, Van Arsdale Fights
Licensing of Gypsy Cabs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1972, at 74.
168. MATHEW, supra note 33 (discussing the history of the NYTWA). "Technically an
association of independent contractors," the NYTWA recently "was recognized by the AFL-CIO."
Editorial, Hailing a Monopoly, N.Y. POST (May 29, 2012, 12:24 AM), http://www.nypost.com/p/
news/opinion/editorials/hailing monopolyddrwYy5WJbWHepLeOShoPl.
169. New York Taxi Workers Alliance, supra note 33.
170. MILLER, supra note 33, at 5. See also supra note 33 (discussing lease caps).
171. Matt Flegenheimer & Michael M. Grynbaum, Taxi Commission Approves 17% Fare
Increase, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2012, at A16; Dana Rubinstein, New, York Taxi Drivers Win Big, Finally,
With a Fare Hike and Limits on Agent Fees, CAPITAL (June 12, 2012, 1:50 PM),
http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/politics/2012/07/6185736/new-york-taxi-drivers-win-big-
finally-fare-hike-and-limits-agent-fe.
172. Horwitz & Cumming, supra note 16. The Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, the trade
organization representing most of the taxi fleets, criticized the proposal to allocate most of the recent
fare increase to taxi drivers as "retaliating against the taxi leasing companies' for their legal challenges
to the [Street Hail Livery Law]." Matt Flegenheimer, Taxi Commission to Vote on 17% Increase in
Fares, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/10/nyregion/nyc-taxi-panel-to-vote-
on-I 7-rise-in-fares.html
173. Another group that pays the costs of limited entry are persons who might be taxi drivers
but for the limited number of taxis allowed on New York streets. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 121, at 6. On
the barriers to employment that limited entry creates, see, for example, FRANKENA & PAULTER, supra
note 30, at 104; and Harris, supra note 121, at 213. Since taxi drivers in many U.S. urban areas,
including New York City, often are immigrants, the employment burden of limiting entry may
disproportionately harm immigrants. HODGES, supra note 37, at 12, 15-16, 30, 158-61; SCHALLER
CONSULTING, supra note 3, at 53. While opening entry by eliminating medallion requirements may
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the number of taxis. 174 There have been complaints for decades that the number
of taxis is insufficient to meet consumer demand for taxi service.' 5 Yellow
taxis concentrate in the dense Manhattan core, leaving most of the other four
boroughs and upper Manhattan without legal street hail service and giving rise
to illegal street hail pickups by for-hire vehicles. Even within the Manhattan
core it is difficult to get a cab in the afternoon rush hour when taxi drivers
change shifts.1 7 7 There also are reasons for thinking that taxi fares in the City
are higher than they would be without medallions.1 7 8 The regulated fare set by
the TLC probably implicitly reflects the high cost of leasing and buying
medallions because the TLC considers industry costs in setting fares. 179
increase opportunities to work as a taxi driver, driver incomes might fall under open entry if taxi drivers
were sharing in the monopoly rents under limited entry. The extent to which taxi drivers share in the
monopoly rents in New York is unclear, given the fees many pay to lease medallions. FRANKENA &
PAULTER, supra note 30, at 104; OECD, supra note 5, at 8; OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING ANNEX J, supra
note 121, at 63-64. On leasing fees in New York, see supra note 33.
174. On the impact of limiting entry on service, see Barrett, Regulatory Capture, supra note
121; OECD, supra note 5, at 8; OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 121, at 4-5, 24, 26-33; and
Schaller, supra note 34, at 500-01.
175. See, e.g., HENNINGSON DRAFT EIS, supra note 2, at 4-12; MAYOR'S COMMITTEE ON
TAXI REGULATORY ISSUES, supra note 37, at 68; MAYOR'S TAXI STUDY PANEL, supra note 153, at II -
12. In theory, regulators could reduce demand by increasing taxi fares.
176. Yassky Affidvait, supra note 46, at 4.
177. The New York Times periodically reports on the difficulty of getting a cab around 4:00 or
5:00PM due to driver shift changes, a phenomenon that also was discussed in a 1966 report for Mayor
Lindsay. Michael M. Grynbaum, Where Do All the Cabs Go in the Late Afternoon?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
11, 2011; Randy Kennedy, As Workers Go OffDuty, So Do Cabbies. Hoi Odd, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,
2000; MAYOR'S TAXI STUDY PANEL, supra note 153, at 29-30.
178. See Lee, supra note 121, at 7 ("Studies comparing taxicab fares in limited entry and free
entry or deregulated taxi markets conclude that effective control of entry is likely to increase the fares.
The fares in limited markets were up to 25 percent above free market rates because of restricted entry
and price controls."). However, it is worth noting that the simultaneous removal of the medallion
requirement and the deregulation of taxi fares might not produce lower fares. Several U.S. cities that
deregulated fares and entry in the late 1970s and early 1980s experienced higher taxi fares and greater
numbers of taxis. Teal & Berglund, supra note 121, at 42; PRICEWATERHOUSE, supra note 30, at 1, 8.
Fares may have increased because the pre-deregulation regulated fares were too low relative to the free
market equilibrium. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING ANNEKE J, supra note 121, at 102; OECD, supra note 5,
at 8-9. Information problems, such as the information asymmetry between drivers and consumers about
what constitutes a reasonable fare, also may have contributed to the increase in fares. Kopp, supra note
121, at 161; OECD, supra note 5, at 43-45. Apart from their impact on fares, medallion requirements
may harm consumers by increasing inflation. Tamer (etin & Kadir Yasin Eryigit, Estimating the Effects
of Entry Regulation in the Istanbul Taxicab Market, 45 TRANSP. RES. Part A 476 (2011).
179. See OECD, supra note 5, at 33 & n.17 (arguing generically, without referring to New
York, that the costs of buying or leasing medallions "inevitably result in higher prices for taxi services"
because the "price is invariably regulated and is, in essence, set by reference to average costs in most
cases").
The public discussion surrounding the TLC's recent decision to increase New York taxi fares
provides evidence for the proposition that the regulated fare is influenced by the costs of medallion
requirements. It is clear from this discussion that the taxi fare is set at least partially in reference to
industry costs. The principal argument that the TLC Chair gave for increasing taxi fares was the need to
boost the incomes of taxi drivers, which the TLC staff emphasized had fallen since the last fare increase
in 2006 due to higher expenses for gas, credit card processing fees, and "other cost increases." Hearing
on Fare and Lease Cap and an Opportunity to Comment on Proposed Rules Before the Newv York City
Taxi and Limousine Commission 29, (July 9, 2012), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlic/
downloads/pdf/transcript 07 09_12.pdf Although the costs attributable to medallions were not
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However, most consumers have much lower stakes in eliminating taxi
medallions than license holders have in maintaining them. 80 Reliable data
about consumer spending on taxis is not readily available. Based on
information about the average number of taxi trips that Manhattan adults take a
year and average fares, Manhattan adults may spend on average roughly $1,034
year on taxis. This perhaps surprisingly high estimate of consumer
expenditures on taxis needs to be kept in perspective. Even if consumers are
spending this amount on a yearly basis, they probably are unaware of it because
they are spending it in small increments over the course of a number of taxi
trips. Furthermore, 76 percent of Manhattan and 54 percent of New York
City-households do not have a car and therefore avoid many of the
expenditures on cars that families elsewhere incur.182 Also, many taxi riders are
high-income earners, which likely further reduces the significance to them of
their spending on taxis. 183
mentioned, these are significant for drivers. For example, before the recent fare increase, the New York
Taxi Workers Alliance estimated that fees for leasing medallions consume almost 40 percent of a
driver's daily gross bookings. New York Taxi Workers Alliance, supra note 33.
180. See generally Rogoff, supra note 37, at 148 ("The public, on a per capita basis, has a
small financial stake in the outcome of the fare increase applications, but their awareness, while often
substantial, cannot compare with the groups that participate directly in the industry.").
181. SCHALLER CONSULTING, supra note 3, at 6, 16 (an adult residing in Manhattan hails a
cab 100 a times a year on average, and the average fare is $10.34).
TLC data suggests that New Yorkers who take taxis may spend an average of roughly $1,925 a
year on taxicabs. From January through April 2012, there were 27,859 responses to a TLC survey of taxi
riders using the passenger information monitor in the back seat of New York taxis. Of respondents,
38% indicated that they took a cab daily, 12% once or twice a month, 31% once or twice a week, and
19% rarely. The weighted average of the responses indicates that taxi riders take a cab an average of 156
times a year, assuming that daily means once a day, once or twice means once, and rarely means never.
The TLC indicates that before the recent fare increase, the average base fare was $10.63, and the
average fare including tip, Metropolitan Transportation Authority tax, and tolls was $12.34. Since we
are seeking an estimate of spending on taxis, which includes tips, taxes and tolls, we multiply the higher
average fare ($12.34) by the average number of rides a year (156), yielding an estimate of $1,925.04.
The estimate is very rough and may overstate annual spending on taxis, even for taxi riders, for example
because frequent taxi riders may have been more likely to respond to the TLC survey. Also, the same
person could have responded multiple times to the survey. It also should be kept in mind that the
estimate is an estimate of annual average spending on taxis by taxi riders, not annual average spending
on taxis by New Yorkers in general, because the TLC survey included responses only from taxi riders
since it was done in the back seat of taxicabs. Thanks to Greg Gordon, External Affairs Analyst, NYC
Taxi & Limousine Comm'n for providing me with the data, explaining the setting for the survey, and
emphasizing that the sample is unscientific. Emails from Greg Gordon to author (Aug. 2 & 9, 2012) (on
file with author); telephone interview with Greg Gordon (Aug. 1, 2012). Thanks to Michael J. Wyman
for the weighted average.
182. IENNINGSON DRAFT EIS, supra note 2, at ES-3.
183. Id. at 30-31 App.B (in a survey of taxi customers, 50.5% reported household incomes
exceeding $100,000, 22% reported household incomes between $50,000 and $100,000, and 27.5% had
household incomes under $50,000).
In cities other than New York, taxi consumers may be more likely to be low income earners or
business persons. On the demographics of taxi consumers generally, see GILBERT & SAMUELS, supra
note 121, at 111-12; FRANKENA & PAULTER, supra note 30, at 102-03; Liston-Heyes & Heyes, supra
note 30, at 104; OECD, supra note 5, at 8; and OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra, at 121. Research
conducted elsewhere on the number of taxi trips that consumers take implies that consumers in places
other than New York have even smaller stakes in taxi fares and service. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra
note 121, at 12; Teal & Berglund, supra note 121, at 50.
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There are reasons for thinking that medallions persist partly because
consumers have low stakes in reducing taxi fares and improving service, while
medallion holders have high stakes in preserving their valuable medallions. The
relative insignificance of taxi travel for consumers means that they generally
have little incentive to organize to reduce fares or improve service. 184 My
review of several decades of coverage of taxi issues in the New York Times
revealed no reference to anything like an organized interest group of New York
taxi riders seeking better service or fighting fare increases.
The relative insignificance of taxis for most consumers implies not only
that consumers generally have little incentive to organize on taxi issues, but
also that entrepreneurial politicians have little incentive to champion consumer
interests in lower fares and improved service. In New York, mayors, not
council members, have tended to be the main proponents of improving taxi
service, reflecting perhaps their political need to appeal to a broad, city-wide
constituency and their greater access to resources and information. 1 However,
184. See generally Liston-Heyes & Heyes, supra note 30, at 104 ("Taxi consumers are mainly
low-income (with no cars) and business people on paid company accounts. Both these groups are
unlikely to lobby for lower fares to municipal authorities." (nor referring specifically to New York)) .
185. On the contrary, there are references to the absence of a consumer group focusing on
taxis. Q&A: Commissioner Gorman Gilbert; Taxi Agency Needs More Than a Tune-Up, N.Y. TIMES,
June 29, 1986, at 424 (reporting that a questioner asked the TLC Chair if he thinks that "a consumers'
advocacy group would help"); Editorial, They Are Taxis, Not Limos, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2012, at 20
("Taxi passengers don't seem to be organized enough to fight these fare increases. A commission
hearing next week will almost certainly draw drivers and fleet owners. But nobody expects much noise
from the back seat.").
The closest thing that I have come across to a broad based consumer group taking an interest in
taxi regulation is the interest that Citizens Union, a liberal good government group in New York, took in
taxi regulation in the 1960s. For example, it expressed concern about a taxi strike in 1965. In 1965 and
1967 it advocated that a commission be created to regulate the taxi industry, which was done in 1971
when the TLC was established. It also objected to a fare increase in 1968. Rogoff, supra note 37, at 160,
170-72, 177.
Recently, persons with disabilities have organized to press the case for a yellow taxicab fleet that
is more accessible to persons with mobility disabilities, with some success as suggested by provisions of
the Street Hail Livery Law. The Law requires that the 2,000 new medallions be for accessible yellow
taxis. Twenty percent of HAIL licenses for for-hire vehicles will have to be for accessible vehicles, at
least in the first issuance of HAIL licenses. None of the 2,000 medallions can be auctioned until the City
makes available the HAIL licenses. The TLC also must develop a disability accessibility plan for taxis
and for-hire vehicles that must be approved by the State before the City can auction more than 400 of
the 2,000 new medallions. 2012 N.Y. Sess. Laws 9, §§ 5(b), 8, 10 (McKinney).
Persons with disabilities have relatively larger stakes in improving the accessibility of the yellow
taxicabs, only 1.8 percent of which currently are accessible, than consumers in general have in better
service and lower fares. Noel v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm'n, 837 F. Supp. 2d 268, (S.D.N.Y.
2011), rev'd, 687 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2012). The transportation options of persons with mobility disabilities
are more limited than the options of consumers generally due to the inaccessibility of most of the City's
subway system, cutbacks in bus routes, and difficulties with using other forms of transport. Class Action
Compl. For Discrimination Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 11, Noel v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine
Comm'n, 837 F. Supp. 2d 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev'd, 687 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2012) ("Medallion taxis are
particularly important for wheelchair-users because these residents and visitors have the most limited
access to other transportation options such as the subway, private automobiles and bus systems.").
186. For example, the Taxi and Limousine Commission was created in 1971 at the insistence
of Mayor Lindsay. Edward C. Burks, Mayor Prods Councilmen to Form Taxi Commission, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 4, 1971, at 1; Maurice Carroll, Taxi-Bill Vote Due Tomorrowi Despite Uncertainty in Council, N.Y.
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except in a few instances, mayors have not seemed willing to devote much
political capital to improving taxi service. Perhaps New York mayors have
intuited that most voters have only limited interest given the relatively
insignificant share of consumer budgets spent on taxis. Mayoral incentives to
reform the medallion system also may be muted by the financial benefits that
city government now derives from the existence of valuable medallions. Since
1980 the City has collected a transfer tax on the sale of medallions. As
mentioned above, the periodic auctions of new medallions since 1996 also have
been a source of revenue for the City.188
2. Organizational Costs
Limited entry likely persists not only because of the high stakes of
medallion owners compared to the relatively lower stakes of consumers in their
elimination, but also because medallion owners and the interests serving them
have lower organizational costs than consumers, for two reasons.
First, license holders can readily identify each other while consumers
cannot easily identify each other. License holders are identifiable to each other
(and to others) because they each hold a license. Facilitating identification, the
TLC currently posts lists of existing medallion holders and licensed agents and
brokers on the Internet. 189
A second reason that license holders likely face lower organizational costs
than consumers is that there are many fewer license holders than consumers.
Hundreds of thousands, and perhaps millions, of people take taxis each year in
New York.190 Within this large diffuse group there is a subset of taxi consumers
that might be expected to take a special interest in taxi service: the roughly
53,600 residents of Manhattan who use taxis to commute to work, and thereby
generate perhaps over "10 percent of all taxicab usage."' 9' But even this subset
of taxi users is much larger than the total number of medallions (13,237).
TIMES, Jan. 27, 1971; Maurice Carroll, Veto on Taxi Fare Hinted by Aurelio, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1971,
at 1; Peter Millones, Mayor Signs Bill Raising Cab Fare, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1968, at 1. As discussed
below, Mayors Koch, Dinkins, Giuliani and Bloomberg also have advocated changes to taxi regulation.
187. Business and Excise Taxes, Taxicab License Transfer Tax, NYC FINANCE,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dof/html/business/business tax taxicab.shtml (last visited Nov. 23, 2012). The
tax is five percent of the price paid for the medallion.
188. See supra notes 129 and 130 and accompanying text.
189. Current Licensees, NYC TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM'N, http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/
industry/current_ icensees.shtml (last visited Oct. 9, 2012).
190. HENNINGSON DRAFT EIS, supra note 2, at ES-1-5 to 1-6. ("New York City taxis provide
approximately 500,000 trips each day.")
191. DESIGN TRUST FOR PUB. SPACE & NYC TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM'N, TAXI 07: ROADS
FORWARD 79 (2007) (using 2000 Census data). According to the 2008-2010 American Community
Survey, 31,027 Manhattanites commute to work by taxi, motorcycle or other means. E-mail from Greg
Gordon, External Affairs Analyst, NYC Taxi & Limousine Comm'n, to author (Aug. 2, 2012) (on file
with author).
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Moreover, the number of medallion owners is smaller than the total number of
medallions.
Medallion ownership and control are concentrated to a degree. Perhaps
"25 to 30 percent" of medallions are owned by roughly 22 fleets.192 As a group,
the roughly 60 plus licensed leasing agents in the City may control almost fifty
percent of medallions, either because they lease out medallions owned by
others, because they own medallions outright, or through a combination of
lease and ownership arrangements. 193 In 2006, the largest leasing agent
controlled over six percent of medallions (812 medallions).194
The fleet owners, the leasing agents, and the lenders that finance
medallion purchases might be regarded as catalytic subgroups' 95 within the
population of medallion interests.196 Catalytic subgroups form within large
populations to represent the interests of the population as a whole. The
members of the subgroups band together because they have higher stakes than
players in the population in general, and consequently are willing to assume the
cost of organizing, even if others will not contribute. In New York's taxi
industry, the catalytic subgroups are made up of actors that have large stakes in
medallions and the resources to organize because they own large numbers of
medallions, or derive substantial income from renting them or financing their
purchase.
192. MATHEW, supra note 33, at 93 (as of the mid-1990s). According to another source, taxi
fleets control roughly "35 percent of all taxicabs in New York" today. Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
City of N.Y. v. Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade, 2010 WL 4494142, *15 (No. 10-618). Still another source
indicates that "[t]oday, five families have an ownership interest in 17.4% of the medallions owned by
corporations, according to city records reviewed by Crain s. And 22 individuals own a third of all
corporate medallions." Smerd, supra note 152.
The trade organizations for the fleets are another source of data on the number of fleets and fleet-
controlled medallions. The Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade indicates that it "is the largest taxi fleet
association in the United States with 33 member fleets and approximately 3,500 yellow medallion
taxis-approximately half of all corporate medallions." Am. Compl., supra note 64, at 5, Metro.
Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. Bloomberg, No. 102472 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 18, 2012). The Greater New York
Taxi Association, another organization representing fleets, indicates that it has "7 member fleets and
approximately 1,500 yellow medallion taxis; representing almost twenty percent of all corporate
medallions." Compl. at 7, Greater N.Y. Taxi Ass'n v. New York, No. 102783 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24,
2012).
193. MATHEW, supra note 33, at 92-93; MANUEL BU, NYC TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMMN,
INDUSTRY PROFILE #3: ROLE OF MEDALLION BROKERS IN THE TAXI INDUSTRY (Jan. 1988); Current
Licensees, Current Medallion Agents Sorted by Agent Aumber, NYC TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM'N,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/industry/current licensees.shtml (last visited Oct. 9, 2012).
194. SCHALLER CONSULTING, supra note 3, at 32.
195. The term "catalytic subgroup" is borrowed from Neil Komesar, who uses it to refer to
smaller groups within larger groups who have greater stakes than the members of the larger group more
generally. KOMESAR, supra note 14, at 62-63.
196. See Michael M. Grynbaum, Legislature Approves Bloomberg Plan To Allow Street Hails
ofLivery Cabs, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2011 (noting that the Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, the
main industry organization representing fleet owners, is "considered the most powerful taxi lobby").
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B. A Note About the Supply-Side
My hypothesis for the persistence of taxicab licenses is a demand-side one
that focuses on the relative stakes and organizational costs of medallion owners
and the interests serving them and consumers. I do not attribute the persistence
of New York medallions to the fact that it is a municipal government that is
supplying these licenses. There are two reasons why I do not emphasize the
supply side. 197
The first is that public choice theory provides no basis for that line of
thought. As a general matter, decision-making costs likely are lower at the local
than the state or federal levels. That is because local governments usually are
less complex than state and federal governments, as they are less likely to
fragment power among many different institutions.198 Moreover, local decision-
making institutions usually have fewer decision-makers than comparable
decision-making institutions at the state and national levels. This makes it
easier for interested persons to reach out to enough local decision-makers to
have an impact, and likely reduces decision-making costs at the local level
since fewer individuals have to agree to effect change.
The lower decision-making costs at the local level make it cheaper for
both small groups like medallion owners and large groups like taxi consumers
to have an impact on policy than if taxis were regulated by the state and/or
federal governments. However, the lower decision-making costs at the local
level are likely to be particularly beneficial for large groups such as taxi
consumers. Recall that the members of large groups are likely to have a harder
time raising resources to make their voices heard than the members of smaller
groups, because large-group members usually have smaller stakes in policy
outcomes than small-group members. Since they have a harder time organizing
to start with, large groups such as taxi consumers likely have somewhat better
chances of succeeding at the local level, where fewer resources are required to
have an impact than at the state and federal levels. 199 Given the relative
advantage that public choice theory suggests that large groups enjoy at the local
rather than at higher levels, then, there is no theoretical basis for thinking that
197. In contrast, drawing on international experience, the OECD offers a possible supply-side
explanation for the persistence of limited entry, arguing that delegating the authority to regulate the taxi
industry to a specialized agency may facilitate regulatory capture. OECD, supra note 5, at 29. However,
the regulatory landscape in New York does not exactly match the scenario that the OECD has in mind
because the City Council plays a role in taxi regulation in New York, directly and indirectly through its
role in appointing TLC members.
198. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Bicameralism: When Are Tio Decisions Better than One?, 12
INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 145, 161 (1992) (referring to the rarity of bicameralism at the local level and
attributing this to the ability of citizens to exit if they are dissatisfied).
199. Thus some public choice theorists suggest that local governments are vulnerable to
capture by majorities, and higher levels of government to capture by small groups. See, e.g., KOMESAR,
supra note 14, at 70, 75.
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medallions have persisted because taxis usually are regulated by local
governments.
The supply-side cannot explain the persistence of New York's medallion
system for a second reason: the number of taxi licenses is limited in many
different cities around the world as a result of many different decision-making
processes. If we were to focus solely on the New York experience, we might be
tempted to attribute the persistence of limited entry to a defect in the political
process at the municipal level given the municipality's dominance of taxi
regulation. Furthermore, we might think that the federal government is more
open to deregulation than lower levels of government such as New York City
because the federal government deregulated important transportation industries
such as interstate airlines and trucking in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
However, U.S. experience provides reasons for doubting that limited entry
is due to municipal political process malfunctions, or municipal as opposed to
federal regulation of taxis. As mentioned above, over twenty U.S. cities
actually experimented with deregulating entry and/or fares in the taxi industry
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, suggesting that municipalities also are
capable of deregulation.200 Moreover, there is no obvious correlation between
the level of jurisdiction regulating and the propensity to deregulate entry in
transportation industries in the U.S. in general. Long before the federal
government deregulated interstate air travel, intrastate air travel was
unregulated by the state of California, at least until 1965.201 Intrastate trucking
was partially or wholly unregulated in some states while interstate trucking was
federally regulated.202
Experience outside the U.S. provides an additional ground for doubting
that political malfunctions at the municipal level help to explain why entry to
the taxi business remains regulated. In Europe there is some degree of national
involvement in taxi regulation in a number of countries.203 The European
countries that decide at the national level whether entry should be regulated do
not follow a consistent approach, with some favoring limited entry and others
200. See supra note 121 (describing the experiments with deregulation and referring to sources
analyzing the impact of the deregulatory experiments).
201. Levine, supra note 10, at 1431-32 n.63.
202. See, e.g., ROBYN, supra note 10, at 22 (discussing economic analyses of unregulated
intrastate trucking in New Jersey and unregulated "household-goods moving" in Maryland).
203. A 2007 survey of 13 European countries reported that in ten countries national legislation
determines whether entry to the taxi industry should be regulated or not, while in three countries local
authorities determine whether entry should be limited. The countries that determine at the national level
that entry should be regulated "often delegated" decisions about the number of allowable taxis "to
regional or local authorities." Bekken, supra note 30, at 40. Fares also are regulated by some European
national governments. Id. at 45.
Gwilliam implies that the level of government that regulates taxis is correlated with whether the
country is a federal or non-federal country. He indicates that "[i]n federal countries, such as the U.S.,
taxi regulation may be a state prerogative" while "[i]n non-federal countries, taxi regulation is usually
the subject of national laws administered at the local, county and municipality levels." Gwilliam, supra




favoring unlimited entry. 204 The variation in policy choices provides additional
evidence that there is no obvious correlation between the level of government
responsible for taxi regulation and the decision to limit entry.
VI. Evidence from New York Taxi History
The best test of any hypothesis is whether it provides an apt description of
reality. This Part starts by recounting the history of the creation of New York
taxi medallions in 1937. It then attempts to illustrate the extent to which the
interest groups created by the introduction of the medallion system-medallion
owners and the actors servicing them-are responsible for perpetuating the
medallion system by analyzing three episodes in the history of New York taxi
regulation and the contemporary reform efforts of Mayor Bloomberg.
In the three historical episodes, as well as in the contemporary reform
effort, the medallion monopoly is challenged by street competitors, by political
proposals to create a new class of competitors, or by proposals to issue
additional medallions. This Part emphasizes that the three historical episodes
were resolved consistent with the interests of medallion owners and the actors
serving them. To the extent possible, this Part also highlights the role of
medallion interests in influencing the resolution of these episodes, and the
channels through which medallion interests exerted their influence such as the
City Council. The outcome of Mayor Bloomberg's reform effort currently
remains unclear as the City is appealing a judicial decision, in a case brought
principally by medallion owners and lenders, that has blocked the reforms.205
Nonetheless, the saga surrounding the reform proposals illustrates the
continuing influence of medallion interests and the channels through which it is
exercised, which once again seem to include the City Council. Thus in
combination, the three historical episodes and the current debate provide
evidence for the political economy hypothesis attributing the persistence of
medallions to pressures from medallion owners and the interests that service
them. 206
204. Bekken identifies five European countries where national legislation limits entry into the
taxi business, five European countries where national legislation prescribes unlimited entry, and as
mentioned above, three where municipalities decide if entry should be limited. Bekken, supra note 30, at
40.
205. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
206. 1 was inspired by Edward Rogoff's work on taxi regulation to provide informal evidence
for my hypothesis by examining selected episodes in the history of New York taxi regulation. In his
1980 Ph.D. thesis, he tested the validity of various economic theories of regulation by applying them to
18 episodes in New York City taxi regulation. Rogoff, supra note 37. 1 am interested in a narrower set of
episodes than Rogoff, specifically only those in which the medallion monopoly was challenged. Also, I
examine episodes from after as well as before 1980.
167
Yale Journal on Regulation
A. The Birth ofMedallions in 1937
New York medallions are a creation of a 1937 New York City
ordinance. 207 Known as the Haas Act after Alderman Lew Haas who introduced
it, the 1937 ordinance capped the number of taxis at the number then licensed
to drive on the City's streets. 208 All existing license holders were allowed to
retain their taxicab licenses, subject to an annual renewal fee. 209 Henceforth,
new taxicab licenses would be issued by the Police Department, which
regulated taxis until 1971, only if its Hack Bureau determined that additional
taxis were required for "public convenience, welfare and necessity."210
The Haas Act was not, as might be assumed, an under-the-table giveaway
to powerful interests in the taxi industry. By 1937 there had been considerable
public discussion of limiting the number of cabs and there was considerable
support for doing so.211 Over 13,000 cabs roamed New York's streets that
212 213
year. Cabs contributed significantly to congestion in midtown Manhattan.
There was a widespread perception that an excessive number of cabs chasing
too few passengers was depressing taxi driver earnings, leading drivers to drive
aggressively and cause accidents.214 Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia had favored
207. N.Y.C., N.Y., ORDINANCES, in Proceedings of the Board of Aldermen and Municipal
Assembly ofthe City ofNew York From January 4, to June 29, 1937, vol. 1545 (Mar. 1, 1937).
208. Id. art. 1, § I (explaining that "the present number of taxicabs licensed and operated in the
city of New York is adequate to meet the public need and demand").
209. Id. art. 111, § 6(a) (renewal of existing licenses as a "matter of right"); id. art. 111, § 4
(fees).
210. Id. art. 111,§ 11(a).
211. Three committees investigated the New York City taxi business between 1930 and 1936,
two of which recommended limiting the number of cabs. REPORT OF THE MAYOR'S COMMISSION ON
TAXICABS (Sept. 23, 1930, Frank P. Walsh, Chairman) [hereinafter WALSH COMMISSION]
(recommending certificate of public convenience and necessity for new cabs and eventually franchising
taxi service to single provider); MAYOR'S COMM. ON TAXICAB SURVEY, REPORT OF THE MAYOR'S
COMMITTEE ON TAXICAB SURVEY 4 (June 28, 1934) [hereinafter MAYOR'S TAXICAB SURVEY REPORT]
(rejecting limiting number of cabs and proposing alternative ways of stabilizing industry); STATE OF
N.Y., REPORT OF THE J. LEGIS. COMM. ON TAXICAB OPERATION & FARES No. 83, at 27 (1936)
[hereinafter STATE OF N.Y.] (recommending limiting number of cabs at current number and certificate
of public convenience and necessity for new cabs). The background to the Haas Act is reviewed in
Rudack v. Valentine, 296 N.Y.S. 976, 979-80 (Supreme Court, New York County, New York, 1937),
aff'd 274 N.Y. 615, (N.Y. App. Div., 1937), which upheld the Haas Act against a constitutional
challenge.
212. Rogoff, supra note 37, at 91-92. While a substantial number, this was down from 21,000
in the peak year of 1931, presumably because the Depression reduced demand for taxis. Id. at 92.
213. STATE OF N.Y., supra note 211, at 19.
214. Diana Rice, Order Sought in Taxi Business, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1932, at 6; Letter from
Maurice Hotchner, Difficulties of Regulating the Taxi Industry Explained, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1932,
at E2 [hereinafter Hotchner]; State of N.Y., supra note 211, at 13-14; see also WALSH COMMISSION,
supra note 211, at 28-29 ("question[ing] the validity of the frequently raised contention that low rates,
by creating a pressure on the driver to speed, are responsible for a high accident rate for taxicab
operations"). Another concern was that individuals injured by cabs often had difficulty recovering from
taxi owners who were either under- or un-insured, or insured by companies that were going under in the
Depression. STATE OF N.Y., supra note 211, at 16-17; Rice, supra; Hotchner, supra. In addition, there
had been a violent strike by drivers in 1934 that contributed to a perception that the industry needed




limiting the number of cabs as far back as 1920. 21 Capping the number of cabs
was supported in the 1930s by newspapers such as the New York Times216 and
organizations such as the 5th Avenue Association. 2 There is no evidence that
in capping the number of taxis the Haas Act's drafters intended to create a
valuable property right in the right to drive a cab on the City's streets.218 Seen
in its historical context, the establishment of medallions was aligned with other
Depression-era legislative efforts to stabilize economic sectors thought to be
suffering from too much competition.2 19
Nonetheless, the creation of medallions corresponds with positive political
theory because the actors that stood to benefit from medallions supported their
establishment. Like large taxicab owners in other cities, the large fleets in New
York that stood to benefit from excluding new entrants supported capping the
number of cabs.220 Some independents who owned only their cabs also
supported limiting the number of cabs,221 although many probably feared that
doing so would allow the large fleets to buy up the limited number of licenses
and drive independents out of the business.222 Also consistent with positive
political theory, none of the incumbent players in the industry was displaced by
the establishment of medallions as the number of medallions was fixed at the
number of players in the industry.223 In addition, the division of the industry in
1937 into fleet-owned taxis (58 percent of taxis) and independent owner-driver
taxis (42 percent) was perpetuated by requiring that fleet-owned medallions be
sold only to fleets and that medallions owned by independents be sold only to
224independents who own only a single taxi2. Freezing the structure of the
215. Taxi Limit Laiw' Signed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1937, at 25.
216. Editorial, Cut-Rate Taxicabs, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1935, at 12.
217. STATE OF N.Y., supra note 211, at 20-22.
218. One drafter recalled decades later that the emergence of valuable medallions "'was a
fluke; no one ever foresaw that these licenses would ever be valuable."' Rogoff, supra note 37, at 90
(citing interview with Oscar Katz, Aug. 23, 1979).
219. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 29-30, 199, 226 (1982); FRANKENA &
PAULTER, supra note 30, at 75; MAYOR'S TAXICAB SURVEY REPORT, supra note 211; Kitch et al., supra
note 17, at 321; Benedikt Koehler, Licence Values in Taxi Markets, ECON. AFF. 51, 53 (June 2005). But
not everyone supported limiting the number of cabs. In 1934, the majority of a Committee appointed by
Mayor LaGuardia to recommend how to stabilize the taxi industry specifically refused to recommend
limiting the number of cabs. MAYOR'S TAXICAB SURVEY REPORT, supra note 211, at 4-9.
220. HODGES, supra note 37, at 66; Kitch et al., supra note 17, at 317-18; MAYOR'S TAXICAB
SURVEY REPORT, supra note 211 (dissent of Harold Riegelman, representative of fleet owners on the
LaGuardia Committee). In 1929, the Convention of the National Association of Taxicab Owners
adopted a resolution supporting limiting the number of cabs by requiring that they be licensed only if
"the requirement of a certificate of public convenience and necessity" was satisfied. WALSH
COMMISSION, supra note 211, at 14.
221. Rogoff, supra note 37, at 88-89 (noting that in 1936, the largest organization of owner-
drivers supported limiting entry).
222. Independents Open Fight on Taxi Limit, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1935, at 8; MAYOR'S
TAXICAB SURVEY REPORT, supra note 211 (minority report of Daniel Levine, representative of
independents).
223. N.Y.C., N.Y., ORDINANCES art. III (Mar. 1, 1937); Rogoff, supra note 67, at 462, 470.
224. Rogoff, supra note 67, at 471-72 (noting that 42 percent of taxis "were individually
owned"); Rogoff, supra note 37, at 95 (same); see also N.Y.C., N.Y., ORDINANCES art. III, § 7 (Mar. 1,
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industry in this way also can be viewed as consistent with the interests of the
incumbents in the industry, or at least of the independent owner-operators
concerned about being driven out of the business by larger fleets.225
Ironically, the establishment of medallions had little effect on the taxicab
industry in the first decade or so after 1937. The number of cabs actually fell
below the legislated cap as drivers "failed to renew their licenses," 226
presumably because they judged that the annual $10 renewal fee was not
"worth" the benefits. 227 It was only after World War II that the legislated cap
on the number of taxis started to bite. By 1947 there already was enough
demand from individuals seeking to provide taxi services to meet the rising
demand for taxis for medallions to have a "positive value." 228 That year the
New York Times reported that taxicab owners were receiving bonuses averaging
$1,500 or $2,500 for their medallions when they sold them with used cabs.229
Medallions came to be sold independent of cabs and a standalone market in
medallions developed. By the early 1960s, the New York Times was reporting
that there was a "brisk, if limited" market in medallions. 230
B. The "Gypsy Cabs"
In the early 1960s, the same scarcity that gave rise to the medallion
market after World War II led to the appearance of illegal "gypsy cabs" in New
York. The first real competitive threat to medallion taxis, consistent with
1937) (discussing transferability). The Haas Act required that the proportions of fleet and independent
medallions to the overall number also be maintained if additional medallions were created. N.Y.C.,
N.Y., ORDINANCES art. 111, § 11 (Mar. 1, 1937). Even today, independent medallions can be sold only to
owners who will own only a single medallion, and the proportions of independent and corporate
medallions must remain the same as in 1937. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE, § 19-504(i) (2011); 35 R.C.N.Y. §
51-03 (definition of independent medallion), § 58-44(d)(1) (West 2012).
225. In 1934 there was support among the large fleets for freezing the structure of the industry
in conjunction with limiting entry. MAYOR'S TAXICAB SURVEY REPORT, supra note 211 (dissent of
Harold Riegelman, representative of fleet owners on the LaGuardia Committee). To a degree, the
division of the medallions into two types also might be regarded as a public-interested anti-monopoly
measure. In 1930, then-New York Mayor James Walker had announced his intention of selling the right
to operate all of the City's cabs to a single entity. However, Walker resigned in 1932 after it came out
that that he had taken bonds from a backer of a large taxi fleet that stood to gain from the award of a
monopoly franchise. HODGES, supra note 37, at 47, 49; Rogoff, supra note 67, at 462, 465-67, 470-72;
Rogoff, supra note 37, at 89, 94-95.
226. Rogoff, supra note 67, at 471.
227. Id. at 462; see also id. at 470-71; Rogoff, supra note 37, at 91-93.
228. Rogoff, supra note 67, at 474; see also id. at 462 ("In 1947, when there were 11,787
medallions, the number of outstanding medallions stopped falling. Around that time, medallion owners
first realized that they owned a scarce and valuable asset, and medallions began to be traded for about
$1,000 each.").
229. Taxi Group Backs Sale of Licenses, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1947, at 21; Backs Profit on
Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1947, at 35 ("It has been said that cabs have been sold at $2,500 and more
above their intrinsic worth because of the medallion . . . . [B]ut taxicab drivers at the union headquarters
... said the average was about $1,500."). In 2012 dollars, $1,500 is $15,246 and $2,500 is $25,410.




positive political theory, the "gypsies" were eventually brought within the
City's regulatory system on terms that protected the medallion monopoly.
One of the most common consequences of limits on the number of taxis is
inadequate service, as caps prevent the supply of taxis from expanding to meet
growing demand for service.231 As a result of the cap, taxis often concentrate in
high-traffic areas where it is easy to pick up fares and ignore outlying areas,
232
which leaves those areas under-served2. This is exactly what has happened in
New York: taxis have increasingly concentrated on lower and central
Manhattan and the airports, ignoring upper Manhattan and the outer
boroughs. 233 As a result, one of the perennial issues in New York politics for
decades has been the inadequacy of taxi service in these outlying areas.
Starting in the early 1960s, many so-called "gypsy cabs" began appearing
on New York streets to satisfy the demand that medallion taxis were leaving
unmet. Some of the "gypsy cabs" were vehicles licensed to pick up passengers
who had telephoned for service, but that also illegally picked up people on the
street. Others were completely unlicensed vehicles. Although the "gypsy cabs"
focused on underserved areas, they also posed a threat to medallion taxis,
challenging their legal monopoly on picking up people on the street. Initially
numbering in the hundreds, the number of "gypsies" may have been as high as
40,000 in the late 1970s. 234
There was an important racial dimension to the emergence of the
"gypsies." In the 1960s, many of the areas that medallion drivers were
forsaking were populated by African-Americans and Puerto Ricans,235 and
many of the "gypsy cab" drivers were African-American and Puerto Rican.236
Prominent "gypsy cab" operators portrayed their work as a civil rights issue.237
The head of the City's Commission on Human Rights seemed to concur,
231. An important reason that demand outstrips supply is that taxi fares are regulated in most
cities, which prevents fares from rising when demand outstrips supply. 35 R.C.N.Y. §§ 58-21(c), 58-26
(West 2012) (fare and revenue distribution regulation in New York); FRANKENA & PAULTER, supra note
30, at 22-24 (discussing fare regulation in U.S. cities).
232. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 121, at 4-5, 24, 26-33; Schaller, supra note 34, at
500; Kitch et al., supra note 17, at 291-92.
233. See, e.g., Yassky Affidavit, supra note 46, at 2-3.
234. HODGES, supra note 37, at 132; Rogoff, supra note 121, at 18; see also MAYOR'S TAXI
STUDY PANEL, supra note 153, at 16-18 (discussing private liveries); MAYOR'S COMMITTEE ON TAXI
REGULATORY ISSUES, supra note 37, at 11, 31-35, 68 (discussing non-medallion car services, including
"gypsies"); URBITRAN Assoc., INC., DRAFT ENVTL. IMPACT STATEMENT: PROPOSED CHANGES TO NEW
YORK CITY TAXI REGULATIONS 1.5-1.7, 4.3-4.7 (1984) (prepared for the NYC Taxi & Limousine
Comm'n) (discussing non-medallion taxis); Gypsy Cahs Cruise City and Thrive Ilegally, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 23, 1964, at 39 (describing "gypsy cab" operations).
235. James Randall, King of the Gypsies, N.Y. MAG., June 22, 1970, at 44; William E. Farrell,
Oivner-Drivers Vote a Taxi Halt on Dec. 11 to Protest 'Gypsies,' N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 168; see also
HODGES, supra note 37, at 131 (suggesting that in the 1960s, "[m]edallion cab drivers became notorious
for racism toward African Americans and Hispanics").
236. HODGES, supra note 37, at 132; see also Walter E. Williams, Taxes, Taxis and the Poor,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1983, at 123 ("Charles Vidich, in a 1976 book, 'The New York Cab Driver and His
Fare,' estimated that nearly 95 percent of all livery drivers were black or Puerto Rican.").
237. See, e.g., Randall, supra note 235.
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arguing "that the city should license the gypsy cabs in African American
neighborhoods, because medallion cabdrivers were not doing their job."238 But
the "gypsy cabs" were a mixed blessing for the passengers that they served.
While the "gypsies" provided badly needed taxi services, some charged higher
fares than the medallion taxis (and some lower), the vehicles often were unsafe,
239
and many drivers were uninsured.
By the late 1970s, a truce developed between the yellow taxis and the
"gypsies": the medallion taxis focused on central Manhattan and the airports,
and the "gypsies" concentrated on upper Manhattan and the outer boroughs.240
Finally, in the late 1980s, the TLC was able to bring the "gypsies" within its
jurisdiction after the City and the State amended their laws to clearly authorize
the agency to regulate the illegal cabs.241
Consistent with the expectations of public choice theory, the framework
under which the "gypsies" were legalized was favorable to the medallion taxi
industry. The TLC allowed medallion taxis to retain their legal monopoly on
street hails throughout New York. "Gypsy cabs" were licensed by the TLC to
pick up people only in response to telephone calls. The "gypsy cabs" were
never granted the legal right that many had sought to pick up people on the
242
streets, even in the outer boroughs where few medallion taxis travel.
Subsequently, the "gypsy cabs" largely evolved into today's community car
services serving upper Manhattan and the outer boroughs that stand to benefit
from the Street Hail Livery Law if it is implemented.243
238. HODGES, supra note 37, at 132; see also Emanuel Perlmutter, Tempers Flare at Taxi
Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 196, at 49 (reporting on the position of the chairman of the City
Commission on Human Rights).
239. MAYOR'S COMMITTEE ON TAXI REGULATORY ISSUES, supra note 37, at 34-35, 68.
240. Id. at 68 (referring to "current detente" between medallion and non-medallion operators).
241. N.Y.C. Local Law No. 76 (1986); see also David W. Dunlap, Cuomo Signs Bill to Let the
City Regulate Its 35,000 Gypsy Cabs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1984, at 1; Kirk Johnson, Gypsy Cabs Move
Deeper Underground, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1988, at E7; Richard Levine, New Taxi Regulations Bring
First Summonses, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1987, at B3.
242. See, e.g., Livery Cabs Make an Offer to City, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Aug. 13, 1986, at 23
(Representatives of unlicensed taxis indicated "that their association members want the freedom to
cruise streets and airports and respond to hails" and "[i]n exchange" they "would submit to medallion
cab fees and regulation." The proposal was opposed by representatives of owners of fleet and
independent medallions); Frank J. Prial, Drivers Jeer and Applaud at Hearing on Gypsy Cabs, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 1972, at 70 (reporting on demonstration by gypsy cabs seeking "the right to pick up
passengers on the street" and a City Council hearing where representatives of gypsies supported
legislation that would allow gypsies to be licensed but not allow them to accept street hails; "[p]rivately,
the nonmedallion-industry leaders said they wanted most of all the legitimacy afforded by city licensing.
They said they would hope to obtain cruising rights later.").
243. However, vehicles continue to provide unlicensed taxi service in New York. Christine





C. Mayor Edward Koch's Unsuccessful Reform Efforts
Starting in the 1960s and continuing until the early 1990s, several New
York mayors unsuccessfully attempted to improve taxi service in the City by
increasing the number of medallions, or creating new classes of taxis for the
outer boroughs. The fate of Mayor Edward Koch's taxi reform proposals
illustrates the power of medallion interests to protect the medallion monopoly
and the role of the City Council as a voice for medallion interests. 244
During the 1980s Mayor Koch and his administration advanced several
proposals to overhaul taxi service that embodied two ideas intended to increase
the number of taxis on city streets. First, the Koch Administration proposed
creating a new type of taxi-in addition to the existing medallion taxis-that
would serve only upper Manhattan and the four outer boroughs except for the
airports, much like the HAIL-licensed liveries in the recent Street Hail Livery
Law.245 These new taxis would have been able to pick up street hails and
provide prearranged service within the areas they served. Second, the Koch
Administration proposed increasing the number of existing medallion taxis by
issuing new medallions, foreshadowing yet another component of the Street
Hail Livery Law, which would add 2,000 new medallions. At various times,
Mayor Koch advocated doubling the number of medallions by giving each
medallion owner a second one,246 auctioning 1,200 new medallions,247 and
giving away 1,800248 or 400249 in a lottery. Both of these ideas generated
244. Before Mayor Koch's proposals, Mayor John Lindsay had proposed selling 1,794
medallions in 1967. Peter Millones, Mayor For Cab Fare Rise Averaging 15 Cents a Ride, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 30, 1967, at 1. In 1992, Koch's successor Mayor David Dinkins unsuccessfully proposed to
increase taxi service outside Manhattan by allowing for-hire vehicles "to pick up people who hail them
on the street and to wait for riders at hack stands in all parts of the city except for Manhattan below 96th
Street." Alan Finder, Dinkins Plan Would Alter Taxi Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1992, at BI. After
this proposal, Dinkins offered a more modest proposal to increase service in the outer boroughs by
allowing "liveries to make pickups ... at designated hack stands." James Dao, Taxis, Liveries and the
New, Plan to Shake Them Up, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1992, at B 1.
245. Under the first iteration of this idea the new taxis would have been known as "green-
stripe" taxis because they would have had a green stripe on them. MAYOR'S COMM. ON TAXI
REGULATORY ISSUES, RECOMMENDATIONS 4-5, 7-8 & App. I (Mar. 29, 1982); Clifford D. May, The
Taxi System: City Seeks Ways to Improve Quality of.Service, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1983, at BI. In April
1985, Koch proposed a modified version of the idea that would have allowed nonmedallion cabs to pick
up passengers north of 96th Street in Manhattan and in the outer boroughs but prohibited these cabs
from entering the rest of Manhattan for any reason, including dropping off a passenger. Medallion
owners opposed this modified proposal. Suzanne Daley, New, Plan To Add Medallion Cabs Offered by
Koch, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1985, at Al. Echoing the Koch-era proposal for green-stripe taxis, the
vehicles that under the Street Hail Livery Law would be allowed to pick up street hails and provide
prearranged service in upper Manhattan and the outer boroughs would be painted apple green. Kate
Taylor, New, Taxicabs Are Green, Literally, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2012, at 21. See infra note 294
(defining HAIL).
246. Jesus Rangel, Koch Offers a Plan To Double the Number of Taxi Medallions, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 1985, at Al.
247. Daley, supra note 245, at Al.
248. Robert 0. Boorstin, City Council Considers Rise in Medallions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2,
1986, at BI.
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concerns about increased air pollution and traffic congestion. 25 0 Both ideas also
were opposed by the owners of existing medallions. 25 1 Creating additional
medallions might have diluted the value of existing ones by increasing
competition for riders. Licensing the new taxis would have undercut the
medallion taxis' monopoly on picking up street hails throughout the City.
Medallion owners successfully resisted Koch's efforts to increase the
number of taxis, apparently relying in part on their allies in City Council. The
campaign contributions that medallion owners reportedly made in municipal
elections may have contributed to the positions of some City Council
252
members. Taxi drivers and medallion owners also may have constituted
significant constituencies for some Council members.253 But a more important
reason for the medallion owners' influence in the Council in the Koch era may
have been that the fleets hired Stanley Friedman as the lobbyist for their trade
249. David E. Pitt, Commission Urges 400 New Cab Medallions, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1989,
at B3. The Koch-era proposals might have resulted in the addition of medallions with different
characteristics than standard medallions. For example, the additional medallions might not have been
transferable. Boorstin, supra note 248; Pitt, supra; Editorial, supra note 87.
250. See, e.g., Suzanne Daley, Study Finds Problems in a Plan for New Taxis, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 7, 1984, at B3 (study by Urbitran Associates for the Office of the Mayor on the proposal to create
green-stripe taxis for the outer boroughs indicated that they "would 'significantly' increase air pollution
while slowing traffic"); Johnson, supra note 125 (reporting on draft environmental impact study of
adding medallions); David E. Pitt, Agency Delays Vote on a Plan To Add Taxis, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31,
1989, at B5 (reporting that the TLC Chair delayed the vote on adding 400 medallions "because members
of the commission had raised concerns about the impact of the vehicles on the environment and our
ability to enforce the proposal"); Ron Stoppelmann, Letter to the Editor, More Cabs Won 't Mean Better
Service, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1985, at 122 (Letter from the President of the Metropolitan Taxicab Board
of Trade) ("[M]ore cabs in midtown will absolutely slow traffic (if that is even possible) and worsen
pollution.").
251. See, e.g., Susan Heller Anderson & David W. Dunlap, New, York Day By Day; Unhappy
Cabdrivers, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1985, at B3; Robert 0. Boorstin, Increase in Cab Fares Delayed
Pending Action on Medallions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1986, at Al; Daley, supra note 245; Daley, supra
note 250; Improving Taxi Service Throughout the City: An Agenda for the New Year, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
2, 1986, at Bl; Pitt, Agency Delays, supra note 250; Rangel, supra note 246; Stoppelmann, supra note
250.
252. Margaret Gordy, Taxi Bill Boosted by Vallone, NEWSDAY, Oct. 24, 1986, at 4 (quoting an
unhappy fleet owner who indicated that he had given campaign contributions to the City Council
Majority Leader); Kirk Johnson, The Region; Taking the Big Business Out of the Taxi Business, N.Y.
TIMES, June 26, 1988, at 428 (referring to "medallion owners" as "dependable sources of campaign
contributions in city elections over the years"). Medallion owners also contributed to Mayor Koch's
campaigns. Josh Barbanel, City To Overhaul Inquiries System, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1986, at Al; Alan
Finder, Koch's Campaign Violated Election Law, Official Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1986, at B3; Koch
Says He Is Not Upset Over Contributions Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1986, at B4.
253. Richard J. Meislin, Koch Says Friedman Has Power To Kill Bills in Council on Taxis,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1986, at Al (reporting that Jay Turoff, then TLC chairman, "said that taxi drivers
were important constituents to several Council members in the boroughs outside Manhattan, where
much of the cab service comes from radio-dispatched, non-medallion taxis"); Gordy, supra note 252
(reporting on demonstration outside City Hall by "[h]undreds of taxi owners and drivers, most of whom
operate out of [City Council Majority Leader] Vallone's district in Astoria and Long Island City");
James Brooke, Koch To Tie Cab Fare Rise to More Medallions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1986, at Al
("'Stanley Friedman represents the fleets, and the independents have a very active lobbying
organization, and there are Council members who represent areas with a fair amount of owners.'"





association, the Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade. The deputy mayor
responsible for patronage under Koch's predecessor, Abraham Beame, in the
early 1970s, 255 Friedman was the Bronx Democratic Party leader for most of
the Koch era.256 Some called Friedman "the political boss of the Bronx," 257 and
true to form he apparently was "an aficionado of private meetings and well-
modulated telephone calls." 258
According to the New York Times in January 1986, "Council members and
aides" regarded Friedman as having "considerable influence over some of the
35 members of the Council, notably those of the 6-member Bronx delegation,
which include[d] the head of the Council's Transportation Committee, June M.
Eisland." 259 Ties to Eisland would have been useful because the Transportation
Committee oversaw taxi regulation,260 and council support was necessary to
increase the number of taxis on city streets.261 In early 1986, the mayor publicly
blamed Friedman for the difficulties he had persuading the Council to increase
the number of taxis.262
254. TEMP. COMM'N OF INVESTIGATION OF THE STATE OF N.Y., AN INVESTIGATION OF THE
NEW YORK CITY TAXI AND LIMOUSINE COMMISSION: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 61 (1986)
[hereinafter TRAGER COMM'N] (David G. Trager, Chairman) (on file with author) (observing that the
Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade "has often been represented legally by Stanley Friedman, the
former Chairman of the Bronx Democratic Party Committee"); Brooke, supra note 253 ("City officials
say earlier proposals for a medallion increase were blocked by the taxi industry's powerful lobby,
headed by Stanley M. Friedman."); Allan Finder & Mary Connelly, The Region: Cabs, Koch and New
York's City Council, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1986 ("For the first time, Mr. Koch publicly blamed the taxi
owners and one of their most powerful representatives, Stanley M. Friedman, the Bronx Democratic
leader, for exercising a virtual veto power over city legislation seeking to change the industry.").
255. M.A. Farber, Democratic Chief of Bronx Indicted on Bribe Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
28, 1986, at Al (reporting that Friedman "was deputy mayor in the administration of Abraham D.
Beame and was known as an important dispenser of patronage for Mayor Beame"); Selwyn Raab, Jay
Turoff A Classic Success Story Leads to Dual Portrait ofEx-Taxi Chief N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1986, at
142 ("Mr. Friedman ... as a deputy mayor was in charge of patronage for Mr. Beame and cleared all
major appointments.").
256. Farber, supra note 255 (reporting, in 1986, that Friedman has been "Democratic leader of
the Bronx . . . since 1978"); TRAGER COMM'N, supra note 254, at 61 (referring, in December 1986, to
Friedman as "the former Chairman of the Bronx Democratic Party Committee").
257. Don't Bribe the Taxi Monopolists, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1986, at A22.
258. Meislin, supra note 253, at B4.
259. Id. The same article reported that June Eisland denied that Friedman had "'veto power'"
over the Council, and that "[s]everal Council members said the lack of action on a measure to deal with
the problems of New York City taxi transportation resulted from a lack of decisiveness in the Koch
administration." Id. Like Koch himself, his Deputy Mayor Stanley Brezenoff blamed the failure of
Koch's proposals to increase the number of medallions to advance at least partly on Stanley Friedman,
telling the New York Times that "Stanley Friedman represents the fleets, and the independents have a
very active lobbying organization, and there are Council members who represent areas with a fair
amount of owners." Brooke, supra note 253.
260. See, e.g., Joyce Purnick, Compromise Would Add 1,800 Cabs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27,
1987, at BI (reporting that Transportation Committee "is expected to vote on the new version of the
[taxi] legislation today, according to its chairwoman, June M. Eisland, Democrat of the Bronx").
261. See supra note 63 (noting that Council support is necessary to increase the number of taxi
medallions).
262. Meislin, supra note 253; Connelly & Finder, supra note 254.
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Friedman's influence also extended beyond the council into the executive
branch. In 1985, Friedman boasted that "'no one has more knowledge of how
government functions and operates, no one has more access to the process in
the bureaucracy, than I do."' 263 Fortuitously, as deputy mayor under Beame,
Friedman had played a role in appointing the TLC chair for most of the Koch
era, Jay Turoff, to his chairmanship.264 Turoff had no obvious experience
qualifying him to be TLC chair when he was appointed.265 But as public choice
theory would predict, he became close to the taxi industry as chair. In 1986 he
was embroiled in a municipal corruption scandal that included allegations that
Turoff had granted "free taxi medallions" 266 to a large fleet owner for a
"bogus"267 experiment "testing diesel-powered taxicabs."268 Looking at the
TLC after Turoff resigned, the New York State Commission of Investigation
concluded that the agency was "unduly subject to the influence of the industry
it oversees." 269
Testifying to Friedman's influence, the only time that Koch came close to
increasing the number of medallions was after Friedman disappeared from the
political scene.270 In March 1986, Friedman was indicted for bribery in
connection with a contract let by the City's Parking Violations Bureau.271 A
272
year later, after Friedman was convicted, the City Council passed legislation
under which the TLC was to examine the environmental impact of adding up
to 1,800 new non-transferable medallions, and to make a recommendation to
the Council on the number of new medallions to create. "If the Council fail[ed]
to act in 60 days, the commission's recommendation would go into effect." 273
As it turned out, the TLC never recommended the creation of any new
medallions. Shortly after Koch lost the mayoral primary to David Dinkins in
263. Farber, supra note 255 (quoting Stanley Friedman).
264. Raab, supra note 255. TLC chair from December 1977 to March 1986, Turoff was
appointed chair on "Beame's last working day as Mayor" and retained by Koch. Id.; see also TRAGER
COMM'N, supra note 254, at 1.
265. Raab, supra note 255.
266. Id.
267. TRAGER COMM'N, supra note 254, at 2.
268. Id. at 2; see also James Barron, Tangled Strands: Anatomy of the New, York City Scandal,
N.Y. TIMES, March 23, 1987, at B4 (identifying investigations, cases and allegations in the corruption
scandal); Thomas Morgan, Turoff and Cab Owner Plead Guilty in Scheme for Extra Medallions, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 1989 (reporting that Turoff and a large fleet owner "each pleaded guilty yesterday to
participating in a scheme to misappropriate 23 taxicab medallions and more than $500,000 in taxicab
revenues"); Raab, supra note 255 (discussing allegations involving Turoff).
269. TRAGER COMM'N, supra note 254, at 5.
270. Purnick, supra note 260. See also N.Y.C. Local Law No. 14 (1987) (authorizing the
creation of up to 1,800 nontransferable medallions pending environmental review, and TLC and Council
approval).
271. Farber, supra note 255.
272. Purnick, supra note 260.
273. Id.; see also City Council Backs Increase in Number of Taxi Medallions, N.Y. TIMES,





September 1989, the TLC voted 5-2 not to recommend adding the 400
medallions that the environmental impact analysis suggested could be
created. 274 The vote presumably satisfied the fleets and independent medallion
owners who were "widely opposed" to the proposal.2 7 5
Only months before his final proposal to increase the number of
medallions was defeated, Koch had come out in favor of eliminating the TLC
and shifting taxi regulation to "an executive agency." 276 The New York Times
reported that Koch had "told the Charter Revision Commission in a letter made
public at City Hall that it was hard to obtain a consensus on the [TLC] ...
because of the five Council-appointed members," 2 n who, Koch explained,
"'tend to see their function on the commission as representing parochial
concerns, not the development of a comprehensive transportation policy."'
278
D. New Medallion Auctions
In the mid-1990s, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani achieved the goal that had
eluded Mayor Koch of adding new medallions, auctioning 400 new medallions
in 1996-1997.279 In 2004-2008, Mayor Bloomberg followed up by auctioning
an additional 1,050 medallions.28 0
Why were Mayors Giuliani and Bloomberg able to add new medallions
when other mayors were unsuccessful in their efforts? One factor that likely
contributed to their success was the support that Mayors Giuliani and
Bloomberg were able to obtain from at least some medallion owners for
creating additional medallions. After years of opposing increasing the number
of medallions, the fleets supported Giuliani's addition of 400 new medallions in
1996.281 Bloomberg's creation of additional medallions in the mid-2000s seems
to have had even broader support among medallion owners.282
There are a number of likely explanations for the industry support of the
addition of new medallions. One is that neither mayor proposed to increase the
number of medallions as part of an attack on the medallion monopoly, but
274. David E. Pitt, Taxi Panel Rejects Plan for 400 Newi Medallions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
1989, at B3.
275. Id. See also Pitt, supra note 250, at B5 (suggesting there was opposition to the proposal
to add 400 new medallions from "many taxi owners and drivers").
276. Pitt, supra note 249, at B3.
277. Id.
278. Id. (quoting letter written by Koch).
279. See supra notes 65, 129, and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 66, 130-131, and accompanying text.
281. Garry Pierre-Pierre, Panel Clears Plan To Enlarge Taxicab Fleet, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27,
1996 (reporting that large fleet owners support adding 400 medallions although small operators are
opposed).
282. Lipton, supra note 130 (noting that the taxi industry did not oppose the sale of 900 new
medallions). As explained earlier, the City initially decided to sell 900 new medallions and then decided
in 2006 to auction an additional 150 medallions. See supra note 66.
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rather in good measure to raise revenue for the City.283 A second is that both
mayors paired increases in the number of medallions with sizeable fare
increases that may have more than offset the effect of adding more medallions
on medallion values. 284 One economist estimates that medallion values
increased by 19 percent as a result of the 1996 fare increase even after taking
into account the effect of adding 400 new medallions in 1996-1997.285
The decision to auction medallions as opposed to giving them away or
allocating them administratively also helps to explain the industry support for
increasing the number of medallions. The use of auctions benefited existing
medallion owners by reinforcing the idea that medallions are a valuable
286
commodity2. The auctions also created new business opportunities for lenders
such as Medallion Financial to finance the purchase of medallions.287
Furthermore, the timing and the conduct of the auctions supported medallion
values to the benefit of existing medallion owners and medallion lenders. The
auctions were spaced out,288 which avoided flooding the market with new
medallions that might have depressed the prices of existing ones and reduced
the revenue collected by the City through the auctions. The TLC also
established minimum bids for each sealed-bid auction based on the sale prices
of medallions in the active secondary medallion market.289 Overall, it is worth
recalling that the addition of a total of 1,450 medallions between 1996 and
2008 increased the number of medallions by only about 12 percent and that
283. See supra notes 129-131 and accompanying text (discussing the motivations for the
medallion auctions).
284. For evidence that the coupling of fare increases and medallion auctions assuaged
medallion owners see, for example, Tim Gray, Investing; A Lender Hopes To Profit From the Aew Taxi
Math, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 25, 2004, at 38; Lipton, supra note 130; and Pierre-Pierre, supra note 281. See
also Compl., supra note 144, at 9, Taxicab Serv. Ass'n v. New York, No. 102553 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr.
27, 2012) ("During the medallion issuance that began in 2004 ... [t]he City also increased the statutory
fare to make medallions more financially attractive-further solidifying expectations and confirming the
bargain in which the City gave something of value in exchange for the industry's support for, and
investment in, a relatively small number of medallions."). Taxi ridership in New York usually declines
initially following a fare increase but then rebounds in short order. As a result, a fare increase usually is
a money-maker for the taxi industry. Rogoff, supra note 37, at 49 (noting that every fare increase in
New York during the study increased the revenue of taxi operators).
285. Ricardo Lagos, An Analysis ofthe Market for Taxicab Rides in Aew York City, 44:2 INT'L
EcoN. REV. 423, 424 (2003).
286. The value of the commodity was evident from the sums that the City raised from the
auctions. Newman, supra note 65, at B3 (reporting that City earned "about $85 million" from auctions
of 400 medallions in 1996 and 1997); NYC TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM'N, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 66, at 21 (noting that the 2004-2008 auctions of 1,050 medallions generated "over $400 million"
for the City).
287. Gray, supra note 284.
288. See, e.g., Perez-Pena, supra note 129 (discussing timing of 1996-1997 auctions); NYC
TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM'N, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 12, available at www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/
pdf/2004_annual report.pdf (discussing timing of 2004 auctions).
289. NYC TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM'N, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 288, at 11; see





medallions still remain scarce, with the number of medallions today lower than
the number issued in 1937.290
E. Mayor Bloomberg's Five Borough Taxi Plan
In January 2011, Mayor Bloomberg made an announcement in his State of
the City Address that recalled the efforts of Mayors Koch and Dinkins to
improve taxi service in the outer boroughs that medallion taxis long ago largely
abandoned. Bloomberg asked: "[W]hy shouldn't someone in the Bronx,
Brooklyn, Queens, or Staten Island be able to hail a legal cab on the street? 97
percent of yellow cab pick-ups happen in Manhattan or at the airports- even
though eighty percent of New Yorkers live outside of Manhattan." 291 He then
promised that "[t]his year, we'll establish a new category of livery cars that can
make on-street pickups outside of Manhattan." 292 It did not take the medallion
industry long to recognize that the mayor was proposing to reduce the
geographic scope of its monopoly in the walk-up market.
In the ensuing months, various options for implementing Bloomberg's
commitment were discussed in meetings involving taxi and livery stakeholders,
the TLC and state officials. 293 The package that passed the state legislature
would legalize street hail pickups in the outer boroughs and upper Manhattan
by community liveries, the incumbents widely regarded as providing the
service illegally at the moment. The Street Hail Livery Law establishes a
distinct, numerically limited class of 18,000 HAIL licenses that livery car
drivers and owners can purchase for a fee from the TLC that will entitle them
290. A Deputy Mayor under Giuliani describes the 1996 auctions as follows: "The 1996
Issuance was the product of local democratic processes, coming only at the end of substantial
negotiations at the City level, which included the input of constituents from the medallion lending
industry. In the end, out of concern for the livelihoods of medallion taxi owners and drivers, as well as
for the lenders who finance medallion purchases, the City Council called for a limited and economically
sustainable number of new medallions to be issued." Affirmation of Randy M. Mastro, In Supp.ofPls.'
Appl. By Order to Show Cause For TRO and Prelim. lnj. at 3 (May 16, 2012). Randy Mastro currently
is a partner in the law firm representing the plaintiff lenders. Id. at 1-2.
291. Michael Bloomberg, Mayor, New York City, 2011 State of the City Address: Progress at
Work (Jan. 19, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.mikebloomberg.com/index.cfm?objectid=
A009AFB6-C29C-7CA2-F7A8A2515C60BCC2). Elsewhere, TLC Chair David Yassky indicates that,
"[a]ccording to recent GPS data collected by TLC, approximately 95% of all yellow taxi street hail
pickups are in the Manhattan Central Business District... , defined for this purpose as Manhattan below
East 96th Street and West 110"' Street or at La Guardia and JFK airports." Yassky Affidavit, supra note
46, at 2.
292. Bloomberg, supra note 291.
293. Andrew Grossman, City Steers New Taxi Option; Proposal Would Create Livery-Cab
Stands To Boost Service Outside Manhattan, WALL ST. J., June 8, 2011. For a city insider's account of
the discussions leading up to the Street Hail Livery Law, see Yassky Reply Affidavit, supra note 131.
For a yellow cab industry perspective, see, for example, Comp. at 11, Taxicab Serv. Ass'n v. New York,
No. 102553 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 27, 2012) (on file with author). For a perspective from the portion of the
livery industry that supports the Street Hail Livery Law, see, for example, Aff. of Jose Altamirano in
Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. for Prelim. Inj. and in Supp. of the City Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. at 9-12, Taxicab Serv.
Ass'n v. New York, No. 102553 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 15, 2012).
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to legally pickup street hails in the outer boroughs and upper Manhattan.294
Like yellow medallions, the HAIL licenses would be transferable by their
owners, creating the possibility that a secondary market might arise similar to
the yellow taxicab medallion market.295 However, the value of HAIL licenses
would be restricted because they can be transferred only to for-hire drivers or
for-hire vehicle owners, and an owner would be allowed to own only a single
HAIL license, which will prevent the creation of fleets.296 Twenty percent of
the HAIL licenses likely would be attached to vehicles accessible to persons
with disabilities.297 As part of the reform package, the City could auction an
additional 2,000 accessible yellow medallions.298
Mayor Bloomberg's proposal to legalize street hail pickups in the outer
boroughs by non-medallion taxis has been opposed by medallion owners and
the interests that service them.299 The yellow taxi industry seems to fear that
legalizing street hails by non-medallion taxis will reduce medallion values for
several reasons. Yellow taxi operators seem concerned about competing for
fares in the outer boroughs and upper Manhattan, although these areas are not
central to the yellows' business. oo More importantly, yellow taxi interests fear
that the reforms will lead to greater illegal fare poaching by for-hire vehicles of
street hails in the Manhattan central business district and the airports.301 The
City dismisses the medallion industry's concerns. It emphasizes that the
legislation would not disturb the yellows' core business because it reserves
294. 2012 N.Y. Sess. Laws 9, § 5(b)-(c) (McKinney). The requirement to issue HAIL licenses
to for-hire vehicles owners and drivers applies only "[w]ithin the first three years of the first issuance"
and there is an exception for accessible HAIL licenses. Id. § 5(b). HAIL is an acronym for "Hail
Accessible Inter-Borough License." 2012 N.Y. Sess. Laws. 9, § 4(b) (McKinney).
295. 2012 N.Y. Sess. Laws 9, § 7 (McKinney); see also Am. Compl., supra note 64, at 25-26,
Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. Bloomberg, No. 102472 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 18, 2012).
296. 2012 N.Y. Sess. Laws 9, §§ 5(c), 7 (McKinney).
297. Id. § 5(b).
298. Id. § 8. See supra note 36 (defining accessible medallion).
299. Yassky Reply Affidavit, supra note 131, at 3; David Seifman, Livery Street Pickups May
Roll Up, N.Y. POST (Jan. 19, 2011, 4:07 AM), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/mike-has-one
hail of plan 1xUE9TNrZlUH97AXs47PAI. It is possible that the yellow taxi industry might support
legalizing street hail pickups by non-medallion taxis in the outer boroughs and upper Manhattan if
yellow medallion owners were allowed to own the outer borough licenses and create fleets of outer-
borough taxis. In 2011, the yellow taxi industry and the TLC apparently agreed to a plan that would
have allowed the industry to own many outer borough licenses, but state legislators from the under-
serviced area balked, fearing that the livery industry that has traditionally served these areas would be
cut out. Yassky Reply Affidavit, supra note 131, at 4, 6. The Street Hail Livery Law would protect these
areas for the current players in the livery industry. Yellow medallion owners would be excluded from
obtaining HAIL licenses in the first issuance, when they will be cheap, by the requirement that the
licenses be issued only to existing for-hire drivers and vehicle owners for the first three years. The
limitations on the transferability of licenses will prevent the creation of fleets. Am. Compl., supra note
64, at 24-27, Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. Bloomberg, No. 102472 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 18, 2012).
300. Am. Compl., supra note 64, at 28, Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. Bloomberg, No.
102472 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 18, 2012); MILLER, supra note 33, at 16.
301. Am. Compl., supra note 64, at 28, Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. Bloomberg, No.
102472 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 18, 2012); Compl., supra note 144, at 19, Taxicab Serv. Ass'n v. State, No.




street hails in the Manhattan core and at the airports to yellows.302 It also
emphasizes its commitment to policing the core to prevent fare poaching, and
argues that it will use GPS technology unavailable in the past to do so
remotely, in addition to traditional enforcement techniques. 303 The City also has
argued that the medallion market has remained unaffected by the discussion
and passage of the reform measures, notwithstanding the concerns of the
yellow taxi industry.304
The medallion industry has spent a considerable amount of time and
resources in 2011 and 2012 opposing Mayor Bloomberg's proposals to limit its
monopoly. Consistent with the demand-side hypothesis, the catalytic subgroups
that seem to have taken the lead in opposing the mayor's efforts to legalize
liveries' street hail pickups are the representatives of the fleets that own
medallions, principally the Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade and the
Greater New York Taxi Association, 305 the lenders that finance the purchase of
302. See, e.g., Defs.' Mem. of Law in Supp. of Their Mot. for Summ. J. at 28, Metro. Taxicab
Bd. of Trade v. Bloomberg, No. 102472 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 7, 2012). See also infra note 318 and
accompanying text.
303. See, e.g., City Defs.' Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Pls.' Respective Motions for a Prelim.
Inj. at 32, Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. Bloomberg, No. 102472 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 30, 2012); Aff. of
Ashwini Chhabra, Deputy Comm'r for Policy & Planning, NYC Taxi & Limousine Comm'n at 3-4,
Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. Bloomberg, No. 102472 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 29, 2012) (on file with
author) (referring to technology that HAIL vehicles will have to install to prevent the meter from coming
on when the vehicle enters the excluded Manhattan core and technology that will provide the TLC with
locational data). For another description of the technology proposed for enforcement, see HENNINGSON
DRAFT EIS, supra note 2, at 4-20, 4-23 to 4-24.
304. Defs.' Mem. of Law in Supp. of Their Mot. for Summ. J. at 29-30, Metro. Taxicab Bd. of
Trade v. Bloomberg, No. 102472 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 7, 2012) (noting that medallion prices "continued
to rise in the three months since the HAIL program was first authorized by state law").
It is difficult to determine whether the medallion market has been affected by the Street Hail
Livery Law. In favor of the City's position that the market remains unaffected, medallion values reached
record levels in 2011 as the mayor's plans were debated in the City and ultimately the state legislature,
and appear to have continued to be stable or rise slightly in 2012. Jennifer Fermino, 705G for Cab
Medallions, N.Y. POST (Aug. 8, 2011, 11:31 AM), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/for cab
medallionsP2WKTNwnDia0zlgYIaKI3N; supra note 6 and accompanying text.
However, an economic analysis done for medallion lenders emphasizes that the absence of a
price decline does not mean the market has been unaffected. The analysis argues "[t]hat prices have not
dropped may well be the result of expectations ... that some regulatory compromise will be reached, as
has been the case in the past, so that medallion owners will not be harmed. It could also be the result of
expectations that the legislation will not ultimately come into force, as a result of legal challenges or
political pressure." MILLER, supra note 33, at 11.
There are indications that lenders have acted to protect themselves but also that lending against
medallions continues to be attractive. At least one credit union responded to the passage of an earlier
version of the taxi reforms by reducing the share of the medallion purchase price it would lend. Other
lenders reportedly increased the interest rates they charge for medallion loans. Dana Rubinstein,
Bloomberg's Radical Proposal To Solve New York City's Taxi Problem, Stalled, CAPITAL (Oct. 5,
2011), http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/culture/2011/10/3623967/bloombergs-radical-proposal-
solve-new-york-citys-taxi-problem-stalle. However Medallion Financial recently purchased a medallion
loan portfolio. News Release, Medallion Financial Announces Acquisition of Medallion Loan Portfolio
of over $10,000,000 (June 25, 2012), available at http://www.medallionfinancial.com/news-release-6-
25-12.htm.
305. The Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade and the Greater New York Taxi Association
are plaintiffs in Taxicab Service Ass'n v. New York, No. 102553-2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. August 17, 2012).
181
Yale Journal on Regulation
medallions such as Medallion Financial and the credit unions organized into the
Taxicab Service Association,306 and the agents that lease medallions
represented by the Committee for Taxi Safety.307
As of November 2012, the medallion industry is winning in its efforts to
block the legalization of street hails by non-medallion taxis in the outer
boroughs and upper Manhattan. In litigation brought principally by the
Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, the Taxicab Service Association and the
Greater New York Taxi Association, a New York State trial judge issued a
decision in the summer of 2012 holding that the Street Hail Livery Law is
See also Grynbaum, supra note 196 (discussing the opposition of the Metropolitan Taxicab Board of
Trade).
306. The Taxicab Service Association, which represents credit unions financing medallions,
also is a plaintiff in Taxicab Service Ass'n v. New York, No. 102553-2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. August 17,
2012). Medallion Financial is not a plaintiff in the litigation but its president has worked against the
Bloomberg reforms. Grynbaum, supra note 163 (reporting on the efforts of the president of Medallion
Financial to avoid the passage of an earlier version of the Bloomberg reforms).
307. Christine Haughney, Cuomo, Under Pressure, Is Still Silent on Intentions for Bill To
Expand Taxi Service, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/18/nyregion/cuomo-
still-silent-on-expansion-of-taxi-service.html (quoting the executive director of the Committee for Taxi
Safety); Rubinstein, supra note 304 (referring to money spent by the Committee on Taxi Safety on a
lobbying firm).
The positions of disability advocates, the NYTWA, and the livery industry also are worth noting.
After the state legislature passed an initial version of the Street Hail Livery Law in 2011, the medallion
interests were joined in opposing the legislation by advocates for improving the accessibility of the
City's taxi and for-hire vehicles to persons with mobility disabilities in an odd alliance that was new to
New York taxi politics, which as described above rarely has included the involvement of consumer
representatives. Dana Rubinstein, How Medallion Owners Adopted the Handicapped Issue to Fight
Bloomberg's Borough-Taxi Plan, CAPITAL (Oct. 20, 2011, 10:21 AM), http://www.capitalnewyork.com/
article/politics/2011/10/3817535/how-medallion-owners-adopted-handicapped-issue-fight-bloombergs-
bor. The final version of the Street Hail Livery Law passed in 2012 addressed the need to improve
access to persons with disabilities through several requirements and disability advocates have not
intervened on the side of the medallion industry in the ongoing litigation challenging the Law. See supra
note 185.
After initially opposing legalizing street hail pickups, the NYTWA ultimately supported the
mayor's initiative to boost service in upper Manhattan and the outer boroughs in exchange for the TLC
taking a number of initiatives. Trevor Kapp et al., Cabbies Slam Brakes on City Hall Proposal Allowing
Livery Pickups in Manhattan, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 21, 2011), http://articles.nydailynews.com/201 1-
06-21/local/29704345 1 livery-pickups-livery-drivers-bhairavi-desai. As mentioned above, the TLC
recently approved a fare increase, and voted to ensure that most of it will go to taxi drivers, in spite of
the objections of taxi fleet owners, who considered the move to be penalizing them for their litigation
against the Street Hail Livery Law. See supra note 172.
The Street Hail Livery Law has split the livery industry. Some members of the industry have
intervened in the litigation on the side of plaintiff medallion owners and lenders, while others have
intervened on the side of the City in defense of the law. Dana Rubinstein, Bloomberg Commissioner
Calls de Blasio s Taxi Stance Nonsense, 'as Carmel and Dial 7 Join Lawsuit, CAPITAL (June 20, 2012,
10:30 AM), http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/politics/2012/06/6024991/bloomberg-
commissioner-calls-de-blasios-taxi-stance-nonsense-carmel. A possible explanation for the split is that
the livery supporters of the Law may be traditional community livery services whose drivers, to varying
degrees, already pick up street hails illegally, and stand to benefit from legalization. The livery
opponents may be operators of large car services providing prearranged service to the airports and the
Manhattan core. Reply Aff. of Jose Altamiro in Resp. to Intervenor-Pls. and in Further Opp'n to Pls.'
Mot. for a Prelim. lij. and in Further Supp. of the City Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. at 7-8, Metro. Taxicab




unconstitutional under the New York State Constitution on three grounds.308
The City is appealing.309
A principal ground on which the trial judge found for the plaintiffs is that
the State's passage of the Street Hail Livery Law violates protections for
municipal home rule.310 The medallion owners' legal victory on home rule
grounds ultimately would seem to rest in good measure on their political
influence in the City Council. The Law could have been upheld in the face of
the home rule challenge on the basis that it satisfied the home rule provisions in
the State constitution, or a "judicially-created 'substantial State interest'
exception."3' Taxicab Service Association holds that the Law does not fit
within the exception.312 It also holds that it does not satisfy the State
constitutional provisions because there was no home rule message from the
City Council requesting the Law. 313 The Bloomberg administration denies that
it went to the State legislature without approval from the City Council in an
"end run." 314 But the fact remains that the administration never obtained a
home rule message from the Council before the State Law was passed,
presumably because the administration did not think that it had the votes on the
315Council. As mentioned earlier, the City Council was an important channel
through which the medallion industry worked to block Mayor Koch's efforts to
improve taxi service. There also seems to have been opposition to Mayor
308. The decision held that the State Hail Livery Law violates the Home Rule, Double
Enactment, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the New York State Constitution. Taxicab Service
Ass'n v. New York, No. 102553, at 33 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 17, 2012).
309. See supra note 55 (describing the status of the litigation).
310. The discussion of the home rule issues takes up 13 of the 33 pages of the decision.
Taxicab Service Ass'n v. New York, No. 102553, at 13-26 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 17, 2012).
311. Taxicab Service Ass'n v. New York, No. 102553, at 14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 17, 2012).
312. Id. at 14-26.
313. Id. at 14.
314. Yassky Reply Affidavit, supra note 131, at 1-2 (denying that there was an attempted end
run); Yassky, supra note 131 (same). The Bloomberg administration reportedly had legal advice that a
home rule message would be unnecessary. Michael M. Grynbaum & Christine Haughney, Bloomberg
Move Exploits Taxi Industry's Limited Reach, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/06/22/nyregion/bloomberg-move-exploits-taxi-industrys-short-reach.html.
315. The trial judge seems to think that the administration "bypassed" the City Council
because there was not enough support for the Law at the Council. Taxicab Service Ass'n v. New York,
No. 102553, at 20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 17, 2012). For journalistic references to the medallion industry's
influence at the Council, Council opposition to the Law, and explanations of the Bloomberg
administration's decision to seek state legislation, see Grynbaum, supra note 196; Grynbaum &
Haughney, supra note 314; and Clyde Haberman, Local Taxi Issues Take a Ride to Albany, N.Y. TIMES
CITY ROOM (June 22, 2011, 8:30 AM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/22/local-taxi-issues-
take-a-ride-to-albany.
There was at least some support among City Council members for legalizing street hails by
liveries. For example, the Council's Black, Latino and Asian Caucus endorsed state legislation
legalizing street hails by liveries. Aff. of Jose Altamirano in Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. Prelim. Inj. and in
Supp. of City Defs.' Mot. Summ. J., Ex. B & C, Taxicab Serv. Ass'n. v. New York, No. 102553 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. June 15, 2012).
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316Bloomberg's reform proposals at the Council3. In recent years there also have
been reports of campaign contributions from medallion owners to City Council
members and other local officials, and the use of lobbyists by the medallion
industry. 317 The apparent political influence of medallion interests with the
Council would seem to have bolstered their legal case, by discouraging the
Bloomberg administration from seeking the home rule message that might have
helped insulate the Street Hail Livery Law from attack on home rule grounds.
If the City ultimately prevails on appeal and the Street Hail Livery Law is
implemented, the Law will still have a number of features consistent with the
interests of the medallion industry. To start, the legislation would preserve the
medallions' monopoly on their core areas of business, Manhattan's central
business district and the airports. Mayor Bloomberg and TLC Chair David
Yassky repeatedly have emphasized that the legislation carves out the core area
of business from competition, as if they were implicitly acknowledging the
industry's influence. The total number of HAIL licenses that the legislation
authorizes also reflects input from the yellow taxi industry. A bill passed by the
state legislature in June 2011 authorized the issuance of 30,000 licenses.
Apparently in response to input from the yellow taxi industry, the final bill
reduced the maximum number of licenses to 18,000, close to the current
number of liveries. 319
There also are aspects of the reforms that offer opportunities for
components of the medallion industry, in particular the issuance of additional
yellow taxi medallions. The idea of auctioning additional medallions was not in
the Mayor's original January 2011 proposal. It apparently originated from the
316. Grynbaum, supra note 196; Grynbaum & Haughney, supra note 314; Haberman, supra
note 315.
317. Michael M. Grynbaum, Taxi Industry Opens Wallet for de Blasio, a Chief Ally, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 2012; Grynbaum & Haughney, supra note 314; Powell, supra note 152; David Seifman,
Maul at Cny Hall as Mike Rips Critics, N.Y. POST (June 2, 2012, 7:07 AM), http://www.nypost.com/p/
news/local/maul at city hall as mike rips critics GkHVQKkQOw5muisBKBOcDK. The medallion
industry also made campaign contributions to state officials in the debate over the Street Hail Livery
Law, and hired lobbyists to lobby at the state level. Jennifer Fermino, Taxis in Hail $torm, N.Y. POST
(Oct. 3, 2011, 7:55 AM), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/taxis in hail torm
NpjXDDjtJM9PvADaoaCImM; Kenneth Lovett, Gov. Cuomo Fares Well as Yellou Cabs Fight To
Knock Out Livery Bill, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 21, 2011; Jeremy Smerd, Taxi Plan Breaks Through in
Albany, CRAIN'S N.Y. BUSINESS (June 24, 2011, 12:05 PM), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/
20110624/FREE/ 110629916.
318. Stephen Goldsmith & David Yassky, Create a Neu Taxi Fleet for Street Hails in
Brooklyn, Queens, the Bronx and Staten Island, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 25, 2011; David Seifman &
Fredric U. Dicker, Open Road for Boro-Only Cabs, N.Y. POST (June 25, 2011, 7:08 AM),
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/openroadfor boro onlycabs 8tH40XiaYMG2AXQmkr4eJP;
David Yassky & Stephen Goldsmith, Better Taxi Service for All, N.Y. POST (June 22, 2011, 12:17 AM),
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/better-taxi-service-for-allYnTaH4NWJPzsd3
qEWyXDLO; Yassky Affidavit, supra note 46, at 8.
319. Dana Rubinstein, Assembly Leaders Plan to Force Cuomo's Hand on the Bloomberg
Taxi Bill, CAPITAL (Dec. 7, 2011, 5:03 PM), http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/politics/2011/12/




yellow industry, which proposed it as a way of improving taxi service in the
outer boroughs.320 The fleets now appear to oppose the issuance of additional
medallions. 321 Regardless of the position of the fleets, for medallion lenders,
the auctions of new medallions will offer an opportunity to finance the
purchase of additional medallions.322 As with the earlier auctions in 1996-1997
and 2004-2008, the City will auction the medallions gradually over time.323
Spreading out the auctions should maximize the revenues that the City will reap
and limit the impact of the new issuances on the secondary market price of
medallions.324
In historical terms, the Bloomberg's administration efforts to legalize
street hail pickups by for-hire vehicles in the outer boroughs is significant. The
"gypsy cabs" and Mayors Koch and Dinkins sought and never obtained the
legalization of for-hire vehicles picking up street hails in upper Manhattan and
the outer boroughs that the Bloomberg administration is seeking.325 But even if
the Bloomberg administration prevails, the medallion industry's monopoly
likely will remain on street pickups in lucrative central Manhattan and the
airports.
VII. Conclusion
New York taxi medallions are an example of a modern form of property
right. Created only 75 years ago, they have evolved into a commodity that is
bought, sold, leased and used as collateral much like conventional property.
The short history of New York medallions enables us to know more about the
development of New York medallions and why they have persisted over time
than we easily can learn about older forms of property such as property in
326land3. In theory, New York taxi medallions might be justified in Demsetzian
320. Yassky Reply Affidavit, supra note 131, at 3. See also Compl., supra note 144, at 11,
Taxicab Serv. Ass'n v. New York, No. 102553 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 27, 2012).
321. In their complaints, the Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade and the Greater New York
Taxi Association indicate that the Street Hail Livery Law "dilutes the value of medallions by issuing
2,000 new accessible medallions." Am. Compl., supra note 64, at 30, Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v.
Bloomberg, No. 102472 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 18, 2012); see Compl., supra note 192, at 26, Greater N.Y.
Taxi Ass'n v. New York, No. 102783 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 2012).
322. Smerd, supra note 317. The lender plaintiffs do not emphasize the issuance of an
additional 2,000 medallions in describing the "crushing blow" that the Street Hail Livery Law will
impose on the medallion taxi industry. Compl., supra note 144, at 18, Taxicab Serv. Ass'n v. New York,
No. 102553 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 27, 2012).
323. HENNINGSON DRAFT EIS, supra note 2, at 15-1 (noting that TLC expects to auction
medallions over three years starting in 2012).
324. Defs.' Mem. of Law in Supp. of Their Mot. for Summ. J. at 29, Metro. Taxicab Bd. of
Trade v. Bloomberg, No. 102472 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 7, 2012).
325. Michael M. Grynbaum, Taxi-Industry Battle Continues, iwith Echoes of]971, N.Y. TIMES
CITY RooM (Aug. 1, 2011, 5:58 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/01/a-taxi-industry-
battle-continues-with-echoes-of- 1971.
326. See also Graham Lake, Demsetz Underground: Busking Regulation and the Formation of
Property Rights, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100, 1111 (2012) (noting that the "recentness" of the Music Under
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terms, especially on the basis that they are a useful tool for internalizing onto
taxi operators the congestion and pollution externalities attributable to taxis.
But upon closer examination, it is hard to explain the persistence of medallions
as the internalization of externalities, or in other Demsetzian terms. There are
too many aspects of the history of medallions that seem more attributable to the
political clout of the medallion industry than to public-interested economic
logic.
The history of New York taxi medallions has a number of implications for
property theory. First, the history underscores the political nature of property
rights in the modern state. The story of medallions suggests that, like other
creatures of political decision-making, contemporary property rights may be
influenced by the stakes and organization and information costs that different
interest groups face.
Second, the history suggests that we should be cautious about attempts to
rationalize the existence of property in economic terms as cost-beneficial from
a societal perspective. As Demsetz and others influenced by him have argued,
property may arise and persist because it is efficient from a societal
perspective. But like medallions, property may evolve even if inefficient from a
societal perspective because of the political process governing property rights,
especially in modern times. There is no necessary correspondence between
what is cost-beneficial for society as a whole and the outcomes of political
decision-making processes.327
A third implication of the history of New York taxi medallions is that the
persistence of problematic property rights may impose costs not only in the
present but also going forward. In intellectual property, scholars have observed
that property rights may inhibit innovation, even though they often are touted
as necessary to create an incentive to innovate.328 Taxicab licenses similarly
may be inhibiting innovation.329 In the New York taxi industry, recent reform
proposals such as the effort to legalize street hails generally seem to have come
from city government, rather than the industry itself.330 It is almost as if the taxi
industry-yellow medallion taxis as well as for-hire vehicles has become too
content with the status quo to push for changes that would benefit
New York permit system "gives us a better opportunity to evaluate the how behind the formation of
property rights" than Demsetz's hunting territories example).
327. See also Bell & Parchomovosky, supra note 15, at 85 n.21; Frischmann, supra note 15;
Levmore, Property s Uneasy Path, supra note 15; Levmore, Tivo Stories, supra note 15.
328. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (May 1988).
329. OECD, supra note 5, at 30; Koehler, supra note 219, at 54.
330. Consistent with the idea that the industry itself has not been very innovative, a company
from outside the taxi industry was the first to introduce into New York an app allowing consumers to
obtain a taxi by smartphone, a development that could erode the boundaries between yellow medallion
taxis and for-hire vehicles. Matt Flegenheimer, Taxi-Hailing App Pulls out of Neiw York After 6 Weeks,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2012; Matt Flegenheimer, City E-Mails Outline Policy Debate on Street-Hail




consumers.331 Problematic property rights should not only be regarded as
burdensome in the present but also potentially burdensome in the future.
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331. See also Haberman, supra note 315 (arguing that "for decades" the taxi "industry has
been a model of resistance to innovation").

